


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GARLAND Country Profile



1. Geography

Garland is a landlocked country on the Eighth Continent. The country is bordered by Northland to the north, Eastland to the east, Southland to the south, and Westland to the west. The capital, Garville, is situated on the centre of the country.

Garland has a landmass of 74,978 km² and a population that is currently estimated to be about 10 million including the large influx of returnees and refugees in recent years. The average number of people per km² is 13, making Garland one of the least densely populated countries. Most of the desert areas in South and West provinces are uninhabited. The Garland population is concentrated around the main cities. The capital Garville is the administrative and economic centre of the country and its metropolitan area is home to almost half of the country's population. The other more populous cities are the provincial capitals.

The terrain gradually rises from plains in the north and centre to eastern highlands where the Eastern Mountain Range is the main feature. The area along the border with Southland and Westland is mostly desert area that extends into the neighbours countries. Altitudes in Garland range from 600 to 3,000 meters above sea level.

The country is well supplied with waterways. The White Line River, which flows out of Southland, is the major geographic feature of the country. Tributaries of the White Line River occupy the eastern part of the country's territory. It supports agriculture and diverse wild animal populations.

A moist savanna climate prevails in most parts of the country but this is not true for the arid south and extreme west and the equatorial forest zone in the southeast. During the rainy season (from August to December) heavy rainstorms occur and often lead to flooding, degrading of already strained infrastructure causing a host of attendant issues in health and sanitation, particularly in poor areas. Early morning fog is typical in forested areas. Maximum annual precipitation is 1,800 mm, occurring from August to September in the White Line River basin, and in the Eastern Mountain Range annual precipitation averages 1,500 mm.

Temperatures are typically above 25°C and can rise above 35°C, particularly during the dry season, which lasts from January to August. The air is dry and it is warm during the day but considerably cooler at night. The skies are generally clear. Sandstorms and dust storms occur in the extreme southwest.

For pastoralists, the hot, dry conditions trigger seasonal human and livestock migration from south to north, which serve as dry season grazing pastures. These seasonal migrations have a direct bearing on resumption and escalation of conflicts among the pastoralists and other groups in their search for water. When the main rains occur (August - September), people and cattle return to the southern areas. Seasonal movements are less pronounced in the more agricultural areas such as along the course of the White Line River, and in forested areas, like the East National Park (semi-dense forest) and Eri National Park (rain forest).

2. Regional History

What is now the Garlandian sub-region comprising Northland, Eastland, Garland, Southland and Westland was the unified Kingdom of Garlandia (circa 1100-1675), ruled by the lineage of hereditary Garlandian Kings of the powerful clans of the Dotan people. The Dotan were a warrior-class and their capital was located in what is now the East National Park.

The Garlandian Empire was comprised of Dotans west of the Eastern Mountain Range (in today's North East, North Eri and South Eri provinces), Eastarians along the coast in today's Eastland, Sunkans (semi-nomadic traders in the Southland Desert area), Abu (farmers of the western plains) and the Northarian people in the northern rainforests.

2.1. The War of One Hundred Moons (circa 1080-1100)

According to the history of the region, the Dotan clans, under the leadership of their Garlandian King, banded together in 1080 to invade the Abu territory to their west. The Abu had been peaceful farmers with no martial history. The Dotan, who relied heavily on trade, seized the Abu land and organized it into collective farming communities to feed the growing Dotan military. The Abu became indentured servants to the Dotan, forfeiting as much as two-thirds of their crops and livestock. The Dotan next embarked on a campaign to control the desert trading routes to the south. Establishing military outposts throughout the desert area they offered "protection" to the Sunka clans in exchange for one-third of their traded goods.

The Dotan ensured that the living standards of the Abu people, although living in servitude, were marginally better under Dotan rule than under their former king. The Dotan eventually brought Sunka traders into the ranks of their army, promising them one-third of all goods plundered throughout the wars of conquest. The Garlandian Empire was growing.

With their eastern flank protected by the Eastarian Mountain range and their western and southern flanks secured and supplied, Garlandia embarked on a long military campaign to subdue the more powerful Northarian tribes located to the north. The Northarians enjoyed maritime trade and were quite wealthy, with a vast array of precious metals and stones. The Northarians were also excellent hunters and traders and successfully repulsed the Dotan until their King died without an heir. Political in-fighting then led to divisions among the Northarian tribes. Garlandian forces were able to negotiate a truce between the warring factions. Gaining allies from among opposition tribes, Garlandian forces invaded and swept through the Northarian territory, slaughtering the former ruling tribe.

Dividing its forces, the Garlandian Empire invaded the land of the Eastarian people in 1094. The Eastarian tribes were mainly wealthy, maritime traders whilst their mountain tribes were fiercely independent with

martial traditions, born from their skills as mountain hunters and trackers. It took the Garlandian army two years to build supply routes and battle the Eastarian mountain people, before they were ready to lay siege to the capital (what is now Port of Eastland). The Eastarian coastal tribes repulsed three sea-borne invasions, wiping out Garland-Northland flotillas and successfully resisted the siege on their capital for two years. When the capital fell to the Garlandian army, it was looted and burned. For their staunch resistance and the costs of the campaign on the Garlandian treasury, the Eastarian peoples suffered under brutal conditions of occupation and were not accepted as Imperial citizens, until the age of Garlandian enlightenment (circa 1430).

2.2. Colonial Rule

In 1648, ships from Middleland (an empire from a distant continent) anchored at the rebuilt port city of Eastland. A trading colony was established and flourished for more than ten years. In 1658 an armada of ships from Middleland's imperial competitor, Farland, anchored off the Garland-Northland coast to the north. The Garlandian King saw an advantage in manipulating the trading competition between the two overseas powers and welcomed both empires as trading partners, despite the protests from Middleland.

Middleland and Farland were waging a protracted land war on their own continent and needed the natural resources, precious metals and stones of the Garlandian Empire. The Garland's warmed to the trade terms offered by Farland, attacked and destroyed the Middleland settlements (slaughtering the colonists) and handed the Port of Eastland to Farland. Middleland, in turn, invaded and a savage war of reprisals/counter-reprisals broke out along ethnic lines.

In 1675, Middleland and Farland signed a peace treaty and divided the lands of the Garlandian Empire between them. Farland established colonies in what is today Northland, whilst Middleland colonized the balance of the Garlandian Empire. As one of the strategies for subduing the Garlandians, the once great mountain city of Garlandian kings was destroyed, and half of the Dotan population was sent into exile into the Northland border area.

The former Garlandian Empire was then called the Eastland Protectorate of Middleland. Ethnic Eastarian people were elevated to the status of "indigenous administrators" within the local colonial bureaucracies and became more highly educated. Over the centuries, the Eastarian tribes came to dominate the Dotan, Abu and Sunka tribes in both wealth and education.

Given their martial traditions, Middleland began recruiting the Dotan into colonial regiments to augment their army's force structure. Between 1720 and 1965, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Garland Light Infantry Regiments (primarily Dotan and named for their former imperial army), gained fame throughout Middleland's imperial military history. However, with the great force reduction of 1966, the regiments of the Eastland Protectorate were disbanded. Between 1970 and 1975, the former soldiers of the Eastland regiments were employed in private security forces in other colonial departments during the drawdown of Middleland's colonial period. By the time Middleland withdrew from Eastland, the remnants of those private security forces were unemployed. They did hire themselves out as mercenaries, fighting in several post-colonial wars on the continent.

2.3. Post-Colonial Period

Colonial rule gradually came to an end in the 1970s. Northland gained its independence from Farland in 1973. Middleland slowly conceded territory, giving the Abu and Sunka people their pre-Garlandian Empire lands back in 1975, establishing the present-day nation-states of Westland and Southland. Eastland gained its independence from Middleland in 1977, maintaining its capital in the Port of Eastland.

In 1981, the Dotan staged a rebellion, forming the Garland Liberation Army (GLA) against the Eastland government and fought a successfully decisive civil war of secession, gaining its independence in 1983. Harkening back to its pre-colonial history, they named their new state Garland, establishing its capital city, Garville, at the confluence of highways linking Garland with the regional border-states. The first President

was John Malik who maintained a firm grip on power for many years. After establishing the Garland Armed Forces (GAF), the Garland government immediately rotated units in mercenary roles throughout the continent to subsidize military pay and benefits, acquire up-to-date weapons and gain practical combat experience. It is suspected that the former colonial powers funded GAF expeditions as a proxy force to advance/protect their interests on the continent.

As the dominant military force in the region, Garland invaded Eastland in 1988, in an attempt to carve out territory to gain access to the Eastland Sea. They succeeded in capturing territory East of Garland's North East Province. However, they were forced to halt their advance due to international pressure and threats of military action by Northland. The GAF did secure considerable territory adding it to the North East Province in 1990. Garland placed Dotan citizens in the North East Province to reduce the influence of ethnic Eastarian tribes.

In 1993, the Garland government forcibly removed the ethnic Eastarian population from the large swath of land surrounding the former imperial capital and established the Eastern National Park. This ethnic Eastarian population was largely dispersed throughout Garland and were forced into roles of laborers and domestic servants.

In 1996, Garland signed a non-aggression pact with Southland.

In 1997, in a surprise offensive, Garland invaded Northland to reclaim territory given during the 1675 peace treaty signed by Middleland and Farland. The "War of Dotan Liberation" lasted 11 bloody months, securing territory west of the North West Province. Given the ancient Dotan clan territorial rights, Garland expanded the North West Province to include the seized territory.

By naming the expanded territory part of the North West Province, regional and international concerns were raised that Garland may have set its sights on further territorial expansion westwards into Westland, based on historical precedence of the former Garlandian Empire. These fears of Garland expansion led both Northland and Eastland to build-up their military forces, at great financial cost, nearly plunging the sub-region into bankruptcy.

Between 2005 and 2016, a violent extremist group, calling itself the Anti-Western Fighters (AWF), began targeting government offices and western business interests and schools in the North and North East Provinces. The terror campaign was fuelled by perceptions that foreign (Western/colonial) business interests were stripping the region of their natural resources and had deliberately sabotaged the lucrative lumber industry. The group was comprised mainly of Abu and Northarian resident guest workers and former forestry employees. The 13-year terror campaign concluded after President-elect Momar personally reached out to the group, despite the objections of the GAF Army Chief of Staff. It is rumoured that the group was paid off with political favours.

Since 1988, the mountain people of both North and South Eri Provinces have attempted to gain independence from Garland. These prosperous areas are relatively isolated and maintain long standing armed opposition groups. These provinces are of great strategic value, with respect to the Garland national security interests, vis-à-vis the Eastland border areas, with the mountain ranges and difficult terrain there protecting its east flank. North and South Eri Provinces are also vital to the Garland economy, considering their rich mineral deposits. Therefore, the GAF has devoted considerable resources to policing both provinces and delivering harsh treatment as reprisals for the activities of the armed opposition groups.

In 2012, a group of Eastarian junior army officers and NCOs staged a coup attempt against the President, over his "heavy handed tactics" against the families of the armed opposition groups in South Eri Province. The coup attempt failed, with martial law subsequently declared and the officers executed. The NCOs were sentenced to hard labour with 15-25 year prison sentences. Traditionally, the officer class has been drawn from the Dotan clans given their access to higher levels of education, whilst the NCO class has been dominated by Eastarians.

3. Political

Politically, Garland is a young democracy. It is a presidential republic where the President is elected by popular vote through general elections and the Prime Minister is appointed by the President. The presidential term is six years.

Administratively, Garland is divided into eight provinces run by local governing councils, and each with its own security issues. There are three major political parties in the country which are sectarian by nature and largely affiliated with the major ethnic groups.

The Garland Liberation Movement (GLM) is a Dotan-dominated political party founded as the political wing of the GLA in 1980. When Garland became a sovereign state in 1983, GLM became the ruling party of the new republic. Since the beginning of the insurgency against Eastland, the GLM had Sunka support, but in 1998, when it became clear that President Malik intended to hold onto power indefinitely, Sunka Chief Shleiman Bashir separated from the GLM, forming the Garland Patriot Front (GPF) to better represent the interests of the Sunka people.

The Garland Democratic Movement (GDM) is an ethnic-based (Eastarian) political opposition party created in 2003. Its emergence was traced back to disputed House of Peoples' Representative elections in 2003. A number of current, senior members of the GDM failed to secure positions as official electoral nominees of the ruling party and chose to stand as independent candidates. George King, the current party chair of the GDM, ran as an independent for the gubernatorial election in North East Province and lost to a minority Dotan.

The GDM seeks to establish a pluralistic political system, with equal access to government resources for all Garlandians. The formation of the GDM was intended to lobby the ruling party and negotiate for political concessions, whilst utilising its community militia to defend and protect the group's existence from ethnic rivals and, if necessary, to retaliate with sporadic attacks to maintain political pressure on the ruling party/coalition.

The GDM has no formal links with the Eriyan insurgency. Those armed groups believe the GDM has 'sold out' and that it recognises and works within the Dotan-imposed hierarchy. The GDM has low but growing support in both North and South Eri.

3.1. 2012/2013 General Elections

As President Malik tried to stay in power more than 29 years, violent protest and riots nearly turned into civil war in 2012. Under pressure from Dotan clan chiefs, President Malik agreed to hold elections.

The GPF threatened to change the political landscape of Garland in 2012, by placing the majority vote, enjoyed by GLM in jeopardy. Street violence broke out between the ethnic groups, but the leadership of both parties worked through a negotiated settlement and swung the election toward Abdul Momar of the GLM.

The general elections were conducted in two rounds, in October 2012 and January 2013 and Abdul Momar (Dotan) was elected. Following the elections, GLM and GPF formed a ruling coalition and won the majority of the 520 seats in the House of Peoples' Representatives. President Momar took office in March 2013 and selected Shleiman Bashir as his Prime Minister.

The results of the 2013 elections were not accepted by all parties, especially by the GDM. Disagreements led to a prolonged crisis and public unrest, which resulted in the death of 193, including civilians and police officers.

3.2. 2018/2019 General Elections

Garland is heading towards the next general elections with the incumbent President and current Prime Minister as front runner candidates of the two political parties under a power sharing agreement.

President Momar is up for re-election. The election period has been volatile, so far, and tensions are expected to rise closer to election-day. Elections were originally scheduled to be held in October 2018, but logistical issues and a lack of funding meant that they had to be postponed by six months to March 2019. It should be noted that the armed groups in North and South Eri Provinces took the delay as evidence that the government was stalling on what is being seen as a national referendum on President Momar's rule. Accordingly, inter-ethnic tensions have increased in the country.

It is unknown what promises or conditions were made to the AWF. However, if President Momar loses the election, there is a threat that the AWF agreement could be placed in jeopardy. The group is already threatening to renew violence on social media, in what is viewed as an attempt to manipulate the election results. Indeed, images of AWF members parading through towns and villages in North and North East Provinces, armed with light and medium machine guns, and Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG) are now common.

4. Economic

Economically, it is one of the least developed countries in the world, still recovering after a series of civil and interstate wars, hurt by the ongoing insurgency in two provinces with an influx of terrorist activities in the border areas. The Government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget.

Garland's economy is fuelled through its mining industry in the North, North East, North Eri and South Eri Provinces. The most lucrative mines produce Gold, Bauxite, Cobalt and Zirconium. Much of the wealth produced by the mining is passed on to refineries outside Garland. The largest mining sites are explored by international mining companies. The Garpet Explore is based on 5th Continent and operates mining sites in underdeveloped countries with regular support from the host country. The profits from the mines are circulated through the national banks, run mostly by Dotan clans. The majority of foreign investment is centred in the mining industry within North and South Eri provinces. The fact that the money from this industry flows through the national banking system and does not go directly into the local economy is one of the issues with ethnic Eastarian armed opposition groups. New discovered mining sites are controlled by armed groups that collect taxes from miners. In some areas, as in North Eri and South Eri, armed groups are also imposing taxes to the foreign mining companies operating in the area.

Garland had been a leading producer of fine wood products through the lumber industry in the North, North East and North West Provinces. The lumber industry was internationally renowned and very lucrative. Guest workers from Westland and Northland were brought into the country to work the tree plantations in the early 1990s. In 2000, four species of metallic wood-boring beetles, the Gold-spotted Oak Borer, Two-lined Chestnut Borer, the Emerald Ash Borer and the dreaded Longhorn Borer suddenly appeared. Although their arrival was likely the result of contaminated lumber equipment shipped from overseas, conspiracy theories abound. Within five years, the infestation spread and ruined the lumber industry. The vast number of dead trees resulted in a series of devastating forest fires that displaced thousands and crippled the treasury.

The guest workers brought in as skilled and unskilled labour in the lumber industry were reduced to menial labour roles when the industry collapsed. They attempted to form their own political party, but the attempt failed, as their limited citizenship status does not include the right to vote up to two generations.

Economic growth has fallen over the last two years in a row, standing at 4.9% in 2017. The slowdown can be attributed to ongoing insecurity in the wider sub-region, and uncertainty about the upcoming presidential elections (postponed until March 19). On the demand side, public investment shrank by more than 2% of GDP, following a big drop in government revenue, whereas private domestic demand showed more resilience.

Despite the rise in international oil prices, which were up by 23.2%, inflation showed little change, rising from 1.8% in 2016 to 2.0% in 2017. The external deficit deepened from 5.0% to 7.4% of GDP in 2017. Strong cotton and gold exports failed to offset the increase in oil imports. It is estimated that gold production

rose by 21% and that the country had a record-breaking cotton harvest of 705,000 metric tons, up by 25%. The current account deficit was financed through a combination of direct foreign investment (60%) and external borrowing (40%).

The budget deficit increased from 2.9% of GDP in 2016 to 4.8% in 2017 as a result of an unexpected shortfall in tax revenue, which shrank from 15.2% of GDP in 2016 to 11.9% in 2017 and an increase in budget subsidies to offset the rise in retail oil prices. In response, the Government moved to reduce expenditure by more than 2% of GDP. This mainly involved reductions in public investment in all sectors, including health and education.

4.1. Trade

The bulk of Garland's external trade is with countries outside the 8th Continent, but it relies on Eastland, Southland and Northland for trade involving use of seaports, with the most accessible routes to the coast being through Eastland, despite the current conflict there. It is thought that this may be due to informal local agreements and cooperation with lower-level warlords that control the transportation to the Port of Eastland. Accurate information on the volume and value of this trade is not available at the time of this report because there are significant volumes of informal, unrecorded trade.

Trade is also highly asymmetric; volumes and values of imports from these trading partners are substantially larger than Garland's exports to them. There are several reasons inhibiting smooth trade but one major concern of traders is the delays involved in getting clearance for goods coming into and out of the country. Presently, only 14 customs facilities are operational in Garland, including facilities at one airport and four border crossings, however two of them are located at Byra and Dafari, in South Eri and North Eri, respectively, and are affected by the armed groups operations.

4.2. Agriculture

Garland has a substantially larger arable land suited for permanent cropping than comparatively similar countries, and currently only a very small portion of this land is irrigated. There is substantial potential to expand irrigated agriculture to meet domestic and international demand for food crops and agricultural raw materials. However, there is little foreign direct investment in the country, thanks largely to the unstable security situation.

Overall, provinces close to the White Line River, and the flood basins around other larger rivers are most suitable for agricultural production, particularly during the wet season. The West and South Provinces are partly desert and unsuitable to agriculture. Significant areas of the country are also forested, with such vegetation most prevalent in areas of North and South Eri, North East, North and North West Provinces.

4.3. Transport Infrastructure

The majority of the existing road network in Garland's is paved, and most of local roads are impassable during the wet season making it difficult if not impossible especially for rural people to trade or move. This is why affected population groups tend to move from these areas at the end of the dry season. Moreover, this raises the transportation costs and also hinders the movement of goods from rural areas to urban centres and markets in the country.

Within Garland, there is poor connectivity among regions and between urban and rural areas. Furthermore, there are only limited connections with neighbouring countries. Connectivity with Northland in the north is primarily by air or river. On the road network, most traffic is between Westland, Eastland, and Southland.

There is only one national rail network in Garland. The King Marius Railroad was constructed late 1800s and connects Abusir, now Westland capital, to Port of Eastland, passing through Garville. This railroad was important to increase exports to Middleland during colonial times. Currently, the railroad operates with limitations and is outdated. A range of constraints limit the pace of recovery in the White Line River transport system, but this river system functions for trade year-round. There is also a general shortage of

equipment for operating river transport services, including a lack of handling equipment for containers, and vessels that are not in operating condition.

4.4. Services

Only 48% of the population has access to electricity. Inadequate electric power supply and its high cost is a major constraint on the economy. There is a limited national grid in Garland, however its series of isolated networks serve mainly the provincial capitals and most populated cities. More isolated areas are serviced by generators. The Garland Electricity Corporation (GEC) has only 68.8 MW of installed capacity that is operational, with which it supplies the provincial capitals and the supply is discontinuous in most part of the year. According to recent surveys, 70% of businesses in Garland have their own diesel generators for power supply. Electricity is widely regarded as one of the most serious constraints to doing business in Garland.

Access to water supply and sanitation services is severely constrained. Only 52% of the population has access to improved water supplies, whereas the average for similar countries is about 68%. Regarding sanitation services, only 58% of the population has access to improved sanitation. One-third of the population still relies on surface water as its main source. Access to piped water is practically non-existent in rural areas, and more than 40% of the population relies on wells and boreholes for access to water.

In the area of communications, tele-density is poor. Garland has not experienced the explosive development of mobile phone and internet use seen in many other countries on the 8th Continent, but this is improving slowly. Prices of information and communications technology (ICT) services remain quite high, with the market mainly focused on voice services, but recently there has been significant penetration of provincial towns, and some rural areas – particularly those with rich mineral deposits.

Print media remains a key source of information for the elite in Garland. There is one major broad-sheet newspaper, available primarily within major urban centres. The paper is largely viewed as pro-government, given the degree of influence and control the Government censors and Interior Ministry retain over its key personnel. Smaller, regional papers are produced within the various provinces, which predominately cover issues of local concern, and do not pay much, if any attention, to wider issues. Their views on local issues are largely influenced by their owners/editors ethnicity and political persuasions.

Mobile telecommunications masts are now located in all major urban areas but tend not to reach areas affected by violence and insecurity. Data services are very limited and expensive, and those with money to spend rely on expensive Wi-Fi or BGAN systems.

5. Social

5.1. Education

The adult literacy rates in Garland are low. In fact, with a national average of 28%, Garland currently has the lowest adult literacy rate on the 8th Continent. This is particularly the case in rural areas where the average literacy rate is only 24%. In urban areas, it is currently about 52%. With current low enrolment rates for children of school age, the problem of illiteracy will likely continue for an extended period.

At the present time, for example, the literacy rates for 15-24-year-old people are only 35% in rural areas and 65% in urban areas. However, these statistics belie a greater imbalance as the Dotan population has a literacy rate of more than 70% and has much greater access to the education system than other ethnic groups, particularly the Abu, the Sunka, and the Northarian. The Eastarian population fared somewhat better as a result of their leadership of greater Eastland until the war of secession in 1983.

5.2. Ethnic Groups

In the North, North West and Central provinces, the majority population is Dotan along major rivers, and on most agricultural land. The Dotan dominate the major urban areas in these provinces. These urban areas

also have a considerable ethnic Eastarian population. The Abu predominate in border areas, which are home to the main refugee camps, with the refugees originating from Westland.

The Northarian and Abu groups originally settled the North and North West land in order to earn money from the now largely defunct lumber industry.

West and South Provinces are very sparsely populated but have a relatively large Sunka population. West Province has minorities of Abus in the border areas and Dotans elsewhere.

Both the Sunka and the Abu are traditionally pastoralists.

North and South Eri Provinces have a majority Eastarian population, but Dotan population groups form a strong minority population.

North East Province is evenly divided between the longstanding Eastarian presence and the recently settled Dotan.

5.2.1. Dotan

- Majority ethnic group (46.9% of the population); population growth remains slow, if not static.
- Majority population in Central, North West and North.
- Minority in North Eri, South Eri and West Provinces.
- 80% of the officer corps in the GAF.
- Control the national banks, access to education, and to government posts.
- The Dotan maintain strong access to health, education and state employment. They occupy the most privileged position in Garland society with significant influence, power and prospects.
- Primarily located/settled in and around major urban areas, and within rural areas they maintain large estates and land.
- The majority Dotan enjoy a higher social status. After the civil war of Garland secession in 1983, the powerful Dotan clans worked diligently to overcome centuries of having to serve under Eastarian bureaucrats during the colonial period. The Dotan took steps to dominate the key bureaucratic posts, the national banking system and the armed forces. To keep the Dotan content, the government provides ethnic Dotan with priority service with respect to social welfare, government subsidies and public utilities.
- When public services fail to function, the Dotan have been known to take to the streets in violent protest, whilst clan leaders negotiate with political officials. The Dotan clans are considered relatively homogenous due to historical lineage. Power remains concentrated within a key number of families centred on the clans historical heartlands in the southern parts of the North and North West Province and in surroundings areas of Garville.

5.2.2. Eastarian

- 34.5 % of the population; population is growing.
- Majority population in North Eri and South Eri Provinces.
- Minority population in North, South and North West Provinces.
- Miners in precious metals in the mountains of North and South Eri Provinces.
- 40% of the Non-Commissioned Officer corps of the GAF.

- Maintain more limited access to health, education and government services, largely occupying low-middle class positions/ranks within the civil and public services.
- Located/settled primarily within the suburbs of major urban areas (cities/towns), rural areas and isolated villages.
- The Eastarian population remains stigmatized by post-colonial discrimination and resentment. Having been favoured by Middleland and placed into administrative positions as local colonial officials, the Dotan are quick to blame the Eastarians for any social or economic problems. The ongoing struggle for independence by North and South Eri Provinces increases public tension, in spite of the fact that the groups instigating secession do not enjoy the full support of ethnic Eastarians. This is mainly due to the violent nature of the groups. Indeed, there is some speculation that the Eastarians in these areas would prefer peace and an accommodation with the government, rather than continued war. However, ethnic Eastarians are not willing to speak out against the armed opposition groups.
- Differences in political leanings separate the Eastarian population in North and South Eri Provinces from the rest of the country.

5.2.3. Sunka

- 10.2% of the population; population growing slowly.
- Majority in West and South Provinces.
- Unskilled Farm/Cattle Ranch workers.
- Nomadic Traders in the desert border region with Southland; when settled, normally located in rural areas, isolated farmsteads and shanty towns around urban areas (towns/villages).
- Maintain very limited (if any) access to health, education and government services. Very limited (if any) potential for social/economic advancement. Suffer a high rate of mortality. Highly vulnerable to (negative) economic and climatic changes. Rely largely on subsistence living.
- Linked to their economic and social vulnerability, they can be exploited by organized crime and terrorist/subversive groups.
- The Sunka tribes of the West and South Provinces live impoverished lives. However, they have proven resilient due to their relative self-sufficiency. They look down on the ethnic Eastarian people as chronic complainers and respect the imperial history of the Dotan.
- To solidify support from the Sunka tribes, President Abdul Momar selected Sunka chief Shleiman Bashir as his Prime Minister in 2013. This was not a popular move with the Dotan clans, although it did receive widespread international support. Southland became closer allies, as a result.
- In the wake of the appointment of a Sunka Prime Minister, provincial Sunka politicians have found themselves elevated to several ministerial positions of power. Some government revenues have also found their way to South and West Provinces, alleviating some of the pressures that the desert climate and terrain brings. The Sunka are generally considered loyal, if not of equal status, by the Dotan.

5.2.4. Abu

- 5% of the population.
- Non-indigenous, Abu workers were originally brought in to work the lumber industry, and so have a minority population in North, North West and North East provinces. In Central and West Provinces, Abus compete for access to water resources with the more settled Dotan. Indeed, some believe that it was this, not the perception of Abu support for the extremist Imuna Kakuatan (IK) that prompted

GAF intervention in the area. It is worth noting that the majority of the refugee population in West and Central Provinces are Abu, most of whom have only recently moved from Westland. These recent arrival augment the 5% of the population that the Abu are officially credited with.

- The Abu are also a nomadic, pastoralist people, but they generally feel no attachment to the Garland state. Located in isolated towns/villages and remote areas, they move with their cattle from Central Province towards river basins, and areas further South with the onset of the dry season. They consider themselves to be from the lands of Westland, but do not feel that their ancestral lands should be appropriated by any state structure.
- Maintain very limited (if any) access to health, education and government services. Little potential for social/economic advancement. Vulnerable to (negative) economic and climatic changes.
- Although IK is 'of' the Abu, the majority of the Abu are tolerant people, and do not support the groups. Loyalty in the Abu group runs as follows: Clan – tribe. The tribes that are considered to be most conservative are the Abu-ryna and the Abu-rela. It is considered that these tribes are those that offer most support to IK. The Abus are also an armed society, with no man considered a man unless he owns or can shoot an AK-47. Often the tribe or clan will also have access to a centralized pool of weapons.

5.2.5. Northarian

- 4% of the population.
- Northarians are indigenous rural people; a small section of the population in the North West area of Central province, in the woodlands of North and North West, and in border areas of North East province.
- Northarians retain limited access to health, education and government services.
- Inherent tensions with the Abu which have been exacerbated by the significant influx of refugees who are taking up land and resources.

5.3. Religion

The Eastarian and Dotan population are largely Christian, though there are some among those ethnic groups that continue to adhere to animist beliefs.

The Abu population is largely Sunni Muslim, and are considered to be relatively conservative, but tolerant of those that do not share their religious beliefs.

The Sunkas are also largely Sunni Muslim but are considered to be less conservative than their co-religionists in Westland.

The Northarians, occupying the northern section of Central and Northeast Provinces are generally animist in their beliefs, and in recent years have become conscious of attempts to draw them – particularly their children – away from what they consider to be their traditional way of life.

There are a number of mosques in eastern areas of Central Province and throughout North East Province, and in urban areas of both provinces, where the Dotan and Eastarian predominate, there are smaller mosques, but no more than one in each major town or village. There is at least one Christian church in every small town and village in Christian areas, and several in major urban areas.

There is no history of religious warfare in Garland and, as such, tensions between Christian, animist, and Muslim have been traditionally low. However, this has changed somewhat in recent years with IK-related violence, and with the tensions against western forces (largely involving Northarian and Abu). Notwithstanding this, the secessionist tendencies of the Eastarians in North and South Eri are more

damaging to social cohesion, and in the past have led to civil unrest in areas where the Eastarian and Dotan live in close proximity.

5.4. Languages

The traditional language of Garland is Lingala and this is almost universally understood, even if it is not spoken by the Northarians, the Abus, or the Sunkas. The language of government, however, is English, reflecting colonial traditions, and this is widely spoken among the educated Dotan.

The Eastarian also speak English, though most of the Eastarian population grow up speaking Lingala. This is particularly common in North and South Eri Province.

The Abu and the Sunka speak Arabic, but unless Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is spoken, the two groups would be unlikely to immediately understand each other. Traders and the intelligentsia of these groups tend to speak MSA.

The language of government in Northarian is Northanguese, but almost all Northarians speak Lingala, and understand English. Once again, this reflects the country's colonial heritage.

6. Security (for details see actor profiles)

The GAF are responsible for the defence of the country while the Garland Police Forces (GPF) are in charge of rule of law within the country. The GSF are not well represented outside the main cities and, as such, local systems of tribal justice are prevalent, and a culture of impunity exists.

6.1. Internal Security

The most significant internal security issues are: secessionist insurgency executed by two groups competing for local supremacy in the east; active terrorist groups operating in west and north border provinces; a large, international criminal organisation called Linoas operating in the North East borders; and a restive local population, all of whom expect the government to provide them with employment opportunities, regardless of the state of the economy.

The ongoing insurgency is driven by the Eastarians in (North and South Eri. The Eriyan National Liberation Front (ENLF) aims to secede from Garland and join with Eastland. The Eriyan Independent Movement Fighters (EIMF) separated from ENLF in 2012 and desires the creation of an autonomous state of Eri. After the split, both groups are competing for access to resources, both natural and man-made. The ENLF operates mainly in the North Eri Province while the EIMF controls the South Eri Province.

Ethnic groups exacerbate national instability and invariably define one's place in Garland society. If one is born a Dotan, one has greater access to economic resources, to government institutions, to education and employment. If one is born an Abu or a Northarian there is little chance of social mobility. Ethnic Eastarians have limited access to state resources, largely as a result of the size of their population group, but are viewed with suspicion by the Dotan, and the GAF, largely as a result of the ongoing separatist conflict in the south east. Essentially, the Dotan consider that the Eastarian in Central, West, and North East Provinces represent a fifth column for the Eriyan separatist groups.

Since 1991, an ongoing terrorism campaign has been waged along Garland's border with Westland, leading to the establishment of semi-permanent refugee camps on the Garland side of the international border. The group known as Imuna Kakuatan (IK) is indigenous to Westland with an objective of unseating the government. More recently, however, IK has been strengthened as a result of many hundreds of its members serving in the ranks of an extremist group in a civil war in the 6th Continent. Some of these personnel returned in early 2016, and quickly embarked on a campaign to improve access to consolidation areas in peripheral sections of Garland's border area. This campaign involved attacking isolated GAF military posts, and some convoys in an effort to ensure IK freedom of movement and action in western areas of Central and West Provinces. Reliable reporting also indicates that the group preys on refugee camps as a means of

gaining access to new recruits (young, male fighters), and supplies (particularly medical and food). After a GAF crackdown, IK began conducting acts of terror in Garland.

In North East Province there are significant tensions between the local Eastarian population, which also harbours secessionist tendencies, and the Dotan settlers. This occasionally erupts in violence, albeit at lower levels than is noted further south. This is largely because North East Province is easier for the GAF to penetrate, and the lack of armed representation that the Eastarian population has in these areas.

The North have a majority Dotan population, but there are sizeable Abu and Northarian population groups here, some of which are reported to have links with the AWF. It should also be noted that some commentators have suggested that the AWF leadership has links to the extremist IK.

There are reported violations of human rights in the areas affected by both the insurgency and terrorism. Indeed, a number of Protection of Civilian (POC) sites have been established in these areas, with the responsibility for their security having been with the GAF in the first instance. However, there are also consistent reports about exactions committed by GAF troops.

6.2. Organised Crime

There is a significant risk of crime throughout Garland but it peaks in urban areas, where crimes range from petty and opportunistic theft to physical violence. Petty theft risk is particularly high in the capital, Garville, due in part to price inflation resulting from the presence of NGO and government officials. The country's high level of gun ownership means the use of firearms is a common occurrence during robberies, home invasions (especially of compounds), and carjacking.

Organised criminal groups can be encountered in North East Province borders. According to the police force these can have some international links with Linohas criminals in Eastland and are primarily concerned with the smuggling trade. The risk of violent crime is highest in border areas. The risk of kidnapping for ransom is also prevalent in these areas, and in North and South Eri Provinces.

Illegal roadblocks can be a problem on several routes in Garland, whereby vehicle drivers and passengers are extorted for the right to pass. The Garland government has pledged to crack down on these activities as part of revenue harmonisation measures, but progress is likely to be slow.

6.3. Regional Security

Northland is in the midst of a civil war. There is considerable speculation that the opposition is being supported by the Government of Garland, or elements within the Dotan clans. Securing the border is stretching GAF capacity and security apparatus as they attempt to mitigate the flows of refugees, diffusion of weaponry, and growing ethnic and sectarian tension. Northland contains significant natural resources and maintains a strategic position within the sub-region given its substantial population and capable armed forces. As such, any significant undermining of Northland could have wider implications in terms of regional security and stability.

In addition, there are more than 200,000 refugees in Garland who left Northland, due to the ongoing hostilities. These Northland refugees are primarily located in the North West, North, and in some sections of North East Province.

Garland enjoys extensive security cooperation with the Government of Westland, which has been strengthened over recent times by significant inter-cooperation against the mutual threat posed by IK. Garland has also cultivated a mutually beneficial economic relationship with Southland, predominantly driven around oil exploration and export.

Relations with Northland are extremely fractious owing to recent and ongoing conflict linked to Northland's civil war, whilst relations with Eastland remain cool given historical and ongoing ethnic tensions.

Oil was discovered in the desert lands of Southland, approximately 70 km south of the Garland border. Plans for a pipeline to the Port of Eastland (the largest shipping hub in the region) became known in 2011. Construction of the first oil wells is estimated to be completed in the 1st quarter 2019. President Momar secured a deal to run the pipeline through South Eri Province and establish a refinery in province. The government of Garland has secured international investment for the project, as well as funding for oil exploration projects. There is hesitation on the part of Southland, given the internal conflict in South Eri Province.

7. UNSMS Programmes in Garland.

Due to increasing food insecurity, lack of investments in farming and herding, high population growth, low income, lack of industrial developments, weak public health and education sectors, and limited domestic markets, Garland relies on a wide range of programmes and activities of UNSMS organizations, including FAO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNWOMEN as well as the IMF and the WB providing extended credit facility agreements and loans.

UNDSS is represented by a CSA, DSA and two FSCOs.

IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO conduct humanitarian operations all over the country, including in the areas affected by the insurgency. In the capital city, there are five premises of UNSMS organizations: UNCC housing OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNEP, UNESCO, UNHABITAT, UNWOMEN and DSS; FAO/WFP office; UNICEF Office; IOM Office, UNHCR Office and IMF/WB Office.

United Nations

S/RES/2399 (2017)



Security Council

Distr.: General
01 December 2017

Resolution 2399 (2017)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its meeting, on
01 December 2017**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Garland, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Expressing deep concern at the security situation in Garland,

Remaining seriously concerned by multiple violations of international humanitarian law and the widespread human rights violations and abuses,

Urging all parties to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel, of United Nations and associated personnel and of United Nations installation, equipment and goods,

Recalling its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014) on Children and Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) on Women, Peace and Security and calling upon all parties in Garland to engage with the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report of 15 November 2017 and *noting* that the situation in Garland warrants a unified and integrated approach, including through a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and, further *welcoming* its recommendations for the establishment of such an operation,

Determining that the situation in Garland continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

(E)

Please recycle A recycling symbol consisting of three chasing arrows forming a triangle.

Bridging Force

1. *Welcomes* the offer for the rapid deployment of the 7th Continent Force (7CF) to Garland to bridge the gap between this resolution and the time it would take to generate the necessary force. The 7CF would deploy on 01 January 2018 and remain in place for a period of six months.

PKO

2. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Mission in Garland (UNMMIG) as of the date of adoption of this resolution and for an initial period until 15 June 2019;

3. It was decided that UNMMIG would commence its deployment by 01 May 2018 and reach initial operating capability not later than 15 June 2018, and full operating capability not later than 15 July 2018.

4. *Decides* that, as from 15 July 2018, UNMMIG will initially comprise up to 8,000 military personnel, including 150 military observers and 120 staff officers and 1,500 police personnel, including 1,200 formed police unit personnel and 300 individual police officers, *calls upon* Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to enhance the capacity of UNMMIG to operate and discharge its responsibilities effectively and *requests* the Secretary-General to recruit qualified staff, who have the competencies, education, work experience and language skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency areas in paragraph 8 below, bearing in mind the need to convey information and provide technical assistance in the most accessible manner to the desired audience;

5. UNMMIG should support political processes in that country and to carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Multidimensional Mission will not only include military force elements, but also other UN agencies and components such as the Information Operation Centre and Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC);

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Garland and Head of Mission of UNMMIG, who shall, from the date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of all activities of the United Nations system in Garland;

7. *Authorizes* UNMMIG to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

8. *Decides* that the mandate of UNMMIG shall initially focus on the following priority tasks:

(a) Ceasefire

- (i) To support, monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and confidence-building measures by the Government of Garland, the different armed groups, to devise and support, as needed, local mechanisms with a view to consolidate and make these arrangements permanent, as well as to report to the Security Council on any violations of the various ceasefires.

(b) Support to the implementation of the Ceasefire and to Extension of the State Authority in Garland

- (i) To support the implementation of the defence and security measures, notably to support, monitor and supervise the various informal ceasefires in place, where possible and practical to support the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, as well as the progressive redeployment of the Garland Armed Forces and Security Forces in the conflict affected districts, taking into account the security conditions, and to coordinate international efforts, in close collaboration with other bilateral partners, donors and international organisations, engaged in these fields;
- (ii) To support the implementation of the political and institutional reforms agreed to by the Government of Garland to encourage the implementation of reconciliation and justice measures of the ceasefire agreements; and
- (iii) To support, within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent local elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements, consistent with the provisions of the ceasefire agreements;

(c) Good offices and reconciliation

- (i) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to support dialogue with and among all stakeholders towards reconciliation and social cohesion and to encourage and support the full implementation of the various ceasefire agreement by the Government of Garland, the Eriyan separatist groups including by promoting the participation of civil society, including women's organizations, as well as youth organizations;

(d) Protection of civilians and stabilization

- (i) To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Garland authorities, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
- (ii) In support of the Garland authorities, to stabilize the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the conflict affected districts, including through long-range patrols, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas;
- (iii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict; and
- (iv) To assist the Garland authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management;

(e) Promotion and protection of human rights

(i) To assist the Garland authorities in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, including to support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the Garland authorities, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for serious abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, in particular war crimes and crimes against humanity in Garland; and

(ii) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Security Council and publicly, as appropriate, on violations of international humanitarian law and on violations and abuses of human rights, including violations and abuses against children and sexual violence in armed conflict committed throughout Garland and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;

(f) Humanitarian assistance and projects for stabilization

(i) In support of the Garland authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;

(ii) In support of the Garland authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects aimed at stabilizing the conflict affected districts, including quick impact projects;

(g) Protection, safety and security of United Nations personnel

(i) To protect the United Nations personnel, notably uniformed personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel.

9. *Emphasizes* the need for 7CF operating in Garland, while carrying out their mandate, to act in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Garland and in full compliance with applicable international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

UNMMIG freedom of movement

10. *Urges* all parties in Garland to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of UNMMIG, in particular by ensuring its safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Garland to enable UNMMIG to carry out fully its mandate;

11. *Calls upon* Member States, especially those in the Eight Continent, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from the Garland of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNMMIG;

Humanitarian access

11. *Demands* that all parties allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need, in particular to internally displaced persons, throughout the territory of Garland, in accordance with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and relevant provisions of international law;

7th Continent Forces

12. *Authorizes* 7th Continent Forces, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, from the commencement of its activities until the complete handover to UNMMIG as authorized in this resolution, to use all necessary means to provide operational support to elements of UNMMIG from the date of adoption of this resolution, at the request of the Secretary-General;

Reporting

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Garland and the implementation of the mandate of UNMMIG, to report to the Council, on 1 May 2018, and then every four months from that date and to include in his reports to the Council updates on and recommendations related to the dynamic implementation UNMMIG's mandated tasks, including by providing appropriate financial information, information on the security situation, the priority political elements as defined above on political progress, relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as a review of the troop and police levels, force and police generation and deployment of all UNMMIG's constituent elements;

14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL MISSION IN GARLAND (UNMMIG)

MISSION CONCEPT

Mission Concept Approved by:

Mr. Obduald Salie Tchadung, Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Garville, 18 April 2018

Mission Concept of the United Nations Multidimensional Mission in Garland (UNMMIG)

18 March 2018

References:

- A. DPKO / DFS Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Missions dated 01 January 2018.
- B. UN Integrated Strategy on GARLAND (notional).
- C. Report of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to GARLAND dated 31 August 2017.
- D. Secretary-General's Report on the situation in Garland dated 15 November 2017.
- E. UN Security Council Resolution 2399 dated 1 December 2017.
- F. DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in GARLAND dated February 2018.
- G. UNMMIG SRSB's Directive and Comprehensive Mission Strategy dated February 2018.
- H. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (Women, Peace and Security).

A. Introduction

1. This Mission Concept defines the overall approach to mandate implementation of the United Nations Multidimensional Mission in Garland (UNMMIG), following the UNMMIG's mandate as per United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2399 (2017).
2. This Mission Concept informs the SRSB Directive and Comprehensive Mission Strategy, which provides the overall strategic vision and priorities of UNMMIG to advance the implementation of its mandate.

B. Context

3. In mid-July 2017, the security situation in Garland began to deteriorate. This deterioration was exacerbated by the civil war ongoing in Northland to the North, and the increase in extremist activity and strength in Westland and across the border in the West. Furthermore, the increased activity of the Eriyan National Liberation Front (ENLF) in the south-east of the country indicated that the humanitarian ceasefire in place between the Government of Garland and that group was failing. This prompted regional and international concern that the Garland Armed Forces (GAF) would seek a definitive military solution to the issue. It is also worth noting that the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Garland and the Eriyan Independence Movement Fighters (EIMF), located further south in South Eri Province had still not been formalized. This patchwork of ceasefires without any overarching political settlement was judged to be a risk factor for the country's stability, for human rights, and for the protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas.
4. Regional and international observers also noted with alarm, bellicose statements from the Government of Eastland, which indicated that it would act to support its brethren in east Garland if the GAF was to re-engage in the conflict. These statements were followed by the Garland's President threatening to invade Eastland.
5. The UNSC was sufficiently alarmed by isolated reports of atrocities in North Eri Province, by numerous reports of human rights violations, attacks on civilian populations, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in Garland's western and eastern border regions, prompting further displacement, and the movement and arming of non-state actors in Garland, including extremist groups, to declare the situation a threat to international peace and security.

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

6. Recognizing that a UN deployment might stabilize the country, and the region, pressure began to grow on Garland to agree to the deployment of an international force to the country, ahead of elections, re-scheduled to be held in March 2019.

7. By unanimously adopting UNSCR 2399, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the UNMMIG mandate to support political processes in Garland and to carry out a number of security-related tasks. UNMMIG should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in Garland.

8. UNSCR 2399 also called for the rapid deployment of the 7th Continent Force (7CF) to Garland to bridge the gap between the decision to deploy UNMMIG, and the time it would take to generate the necessary force. 7CF would deploy on 01 Jan 18 and UNMMIG would commence its deployment by 01 May 18, reach initial operating capability (IOC) not later than 15 Jun 18, and full operating capability not later than 15 Jul 18.

C. Guiding principles

9. Consent of the Parties. UNMMIG has been invited by Government of Garland and the parties to the conflict. UNMMIG will work with the Government, at the strategic and operational level, to deliver security and stability for Garland. At the tactical level there are likely to be events where parties and groups try to restrain UNMMIGs Freedom of Action, these will need to be tackled carefully with direction from UNMMIG HQ.

10. Impartiality. UNMMIG will be impartial, particularly in its actions in supporting the ceasefire and separation of forces. This means being even handed but being prepared to act robustly (politically and militarily) to any violations.

11. Non-Use of Force except in Self-Defence and Defence of the Mandate. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) will make it clear how the military and police components can utilize force to achieve the mandated tasks.

12. Other Success Factors. Promotion of national and local ownership is key to the UN's success in Garland and is a guideline for both UNMMIG and the UN Country Team. UNMMIG is supporting government both at the national and local level and must listen to their leadership and support their intent.

D. Assumptions and risks

13. Assumptions

- a. The continued cooperation of the Garland authorities and the continued consent of the parties to UNMMIG's deployment.
- b. Sufficient access to Port of Eastland and Garland airheads to enable force flow and sustainment.
- c. That Field Support elements can deploy and sustain to meet the Mission CONOPS.

14. Risks and Mitigating Action

- a. The parties return to conflict before UNMMIG deploys and there is no peace to keep. In this event UNMMIG will halt its deployment and await DPO direction.
- b. The parties return to conflict while UNMMIG is deployed. UNMMIG will withdraw from confrontation areas but seek to contain the movement of Threat Actors in order to protect civilians.

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

E. UNMMIG Desired End-State

15. A democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens and enable peacebuilding activities to continue. The end state for the United Nations peacekeeping presence in Garland will be achieved when the minimum conditions to avoid a relapse into conflict and render stability irreversible can be sustained without the presence of United Nations troops and police contingents.

F. UN Strategic Objective

16. The overall objective of the UN in Garland is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in Garland, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which IDPs and refugees can return home in safety and in dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.

G. Start-up

17. Phasing:

a. Initial Deployment

Priority: Early influence on Threat Actors and successful HOTO with 7CF.

Benchmarks include: Mission HQ and Field Offices established; Initial military presence in likely areas of confrontation between threat actors and conflict zones in Sectors West and East respectively.

b. Expansion

Priority: Greater security presence throughout Garland.

Benchmarks include: Military Component at 75% of authorised strength with reach throughout Garland; DDR has commenced; armed groups are cantoned; Humanitarian access to 55% of Garland. Election planning commenced.

c. Consolidation

Priority: Conditions set for elections.

Benchmarks include: Sufficient security for elections; FOM throughout Garland; and Humanitarian access throughout Garland.

d. Capacity Building and Drawdown

Priority: Government of Garland able to provide security throughout Garland. While capacity building will have begun earlier, Mission resources are now available to make this activity a main effort and implement the planning conducted earlier. Priority will be on capability development as this will drive the rate of drawdown.

18. Phase 1 – Initial Deployment:

- a. During the Initial Deployment Phase, UNMMIG will establish its HQ in Garville in order to strengthen dialogue with government departments and national security bodies.
- b. UNMMIG will establish Field Offices in each sector to engage with local authorities and over time the different armed groups.
- c. After establishing a security presence in Garville, the Military Component is to support the Government of Garland to ensure that all aspects of the ceasefire are implemented and observed.

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

It is to ensure Freedom of Movement of UNMMIG in order to support situational awareness. A civil war is the greatest threat to civilians. The Military Component is to deter, pre-empt and if necessary, respond to violations of the various ceasefires. Thereafter the Military Component will operate where it is best able to support the Mission Objectives.

- d. Protection of Civilians is UNMMIGs priority task and against which the Mission will be judged. UNMMIG will conduct actions across Tier 1 (Dialogue and Engagement), Tier II (Physical Protection) and Tier III (Establishing a Protective Environment) to mitigate the risks to civilians.
- e. UNMMIG will build on the coordination with the UN Country Team and the humanitarian agencies to identify areas where UNMMIG may support humanitarian access and human rights assistance access including, when requested, and as a last resort, the provision of security to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- f. Supporting the wider implementation of the Peace Process will include assisting the Government of Garland to establish national authority throughout the country; assist in the preparation and conduct of national elections and assist in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions in line with international best practice.

H. Strategic priorities

19. In Phase 1 and onwards UNMMIG will focus on the following priorities:

- a. Protection of UN personnel and facilities. This is the top priority but for the police and military components it must be accepted that some risk must be taken in order to defend our mandate and protect civilians. This risk must be managed through thorough understanding of the operational environment, planning, preparation and coordination.
- b. Protection of Civilians. At all times it is our responsibility to Protect Civilians and all UNMMIG activities should have this as a central purpose. In the first instance the best way to protect civilians is to prevent a return to conflict. It is accepted that we have limited means and in Phase 1 a limited presence, this places an increased requirement for establishing and maintaining situational awareness so that capabilities can be in the right place at the right time to pre-empt threats to civilians.
- c. Monitoring the Ceasefire and Disengagement. This is the key activity in the region. Accurate and timely reporting of incidents through the chain of command and within respective sectors will enable early resolution. The military component must be prepared to deter, pre-empt and respond to incidents.
- d. Dialogue and Engagement. At Mission level and in the field, we must constantly reach out to engage with government and other key actors. This engagement needs to be managed and coordinated so that the Mission speaks in one voice and is seen as both robust and impartial.
- e. Support to Humanitarians and Human Rights Assistance. UNMMIG will reach out to humanitarian and Human Rights organisations, primarily through the DSRSG (HC) but also at Field Office level to identify how our capabilities can assist their operations. In Phase 1 we will be limited by our capacity and the need to focus on the confrontation areas but our wider deployment in Phase 2 should be influenced by the humanitarian and Human Rights priorities for access.

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

I. Planning coherence

20. This Mission Concept will inform the development of the revised Military and Police Concepts of Operations, the revised Support Plan and the various component and section plans. The revised Military and Police Concepts of Operations and Support Plan will be developed in a coordinated manner, and be consistent with this Mission Concept, the SRSG Directive, and the Comprehensive Mission Strategy, and submitted jointly for approval by the USGs DPO and DOS.

21. This Headquarters and UNMMIG will continue to ensure coherence in planning processes and documents, including by ensuring that the various planning documents and processes are aligned and coherent and linked to CPAS.

J. Monitoring of implementation and performance

22. In advance of the renewal of UNMMIG's mandate in June 2019, UNMMIG and this Headquarters will jointly assess impact on the ground in achieving the strategic priorities defined in this Mission Concept, the SRSG Directive and Comprehensive Mission Strategy, including as part of the roll-out of the CPAS, with a view to inform the Security Council on any adjustment needed to the Mission's mandate.

K. Guidance on the Mission Plan

23. **General.** Cross pillar planning, thematic coordination and coordination with Garland authorities and the UN Country Team apply to all components so that UNMMIG delivers its mandate effectively.

24. **Civilian Component.** The Component will divide between DSRSG (Political) and DSRSG (HC/RC) to be more effective in delivering the mandate. The priority in Phase 1 will be to identify and engage with government and local leaders to establish situational awareness, explain UNMMIG's purpose and build a level of trust which is essential for successful interactions. The HOTO between 7CF is a key component in supporting this activity.

25. **Military Component.** The initial effort is to be in 'policing' the ceasefire and disengagement. If this is effective it will create the confidence in the UN presence that will encourage the armed groups that they will be protected post Disarmament & Demobilization. The likely areas of confrontation will be the main effort until these groups have disarmed, thereafter resources can be tasked to other priorities in Garland.

Under Secretary-General for Peace Operations Under Secretary-General for Support

Date:

Date:

UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL MISSION IN GARLAND FORCE HEADQUARTERS



MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)

1. **References**

- a. Security Council Resolution 2399 dated 1 December 2017.
- b. Secretary-General's Report on the situation in Garland dated 15 November 2017.
- c. DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in GARLAND dated February 2018.
- d. UNMMIG SRSG's Directive and Comprehensive Mission Strategy dated February 2018.
- e. UNMMIG Mission Concept dated April 2018.
- f. Authority, Command and Control in United Nations PKO, dated 15 Feb 2008.

2. **Review.** The CONOPS should be reviewed when there is major change in the mandate or the Mission Concept.

3. **Introduction.** The purpose of this Military Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the United Nations Multidimensional Mission in Garland (UNMMIG) is to provide high-level guidance to military commanders and planning officers for the employment of the military component of the mission. This guidance provides direction for subsequent operational level plans, including military operation orders, fragmentary orders, commander's directives, contingency plans and operational coordination mechanisms to assist the mission in achieving its mandate as established in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2399 (2017).

4. **Situation.**

a. **Background.** In mid-July 2017, the security situation in Garland began to deteriorate. This deterioration was exacerbated by the civil war ongoing in Northland to the North, and the increase in extremist activity and strength in Westland to the West. Furthermore, the increased activity of the Eriyan National Liberation Front (ENLF) in the south-east of the country indicated that the humanitarian ceasefire in place between the Government of Garland and that group was coming to an end. This prompted regional and international concern that the Garland Armed Forces (GAF) would seek a definitive military solution to the issue. It is also worth noting that the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Garland and the Eriyan Independence Movement Fighters (EIMF), located further south in South Eri Province had still not been formalized. This patchwork of ceasefires without any overarching political settlement was judged to be a risk factor for the country's stability, for human rights, and for the protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas.

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Regional and international observers also noted with alarm, bellicose statements from the Government of Eastland, which indicated that it would act to support its brethren in east and south-east Garland if the GAF was to re-engage in the conflict. These statements were followed by the Garland's President threatening to invade Eastland.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was sufficiently alarmed by isolated reports of atrocities in North Eri Province, by numerous reports of human rights violations, attacks on civilian populations, refugees, and IDPs in Garland's western and eastern border regions, prompting further displacement, and the movement and arm of non-state actors in Garland, including extremist groups, to declare the situation a threat to international peace and security.

Recognising that a UN deployment might stabilize the country, and the region, pressure began to grow on Garland to agree to the deployment of an international force to the country, ahead of elections, scheduled to be held in March 2019, mid-way through the dry season.

In early Dec 2017, the UNSC voted unanimously to deploy a multi-dimensional UN force to Garland (UNSCR 2399) but had to acknowledge that the UN would not be prepared to deploy for at least 180 days. Fortunately, the relatively prosperous 7th Continent had stood-up its first Division-sized standby force, complete with strategic airlift as part of an agreement it had made at the 7th Continent summit the previous year.

b. **Current Situation**

After much diplomatic manoeuvring, the first contingent of the 7th Continent Force (7 CF) deployed to Garland on 1st Jan 18 as a bridging force to prepare the way for a UN deployment, with the force reaching full operating capacity within 30 days. The 7CF force deployed in-country via a combination of strategic air and sealift. All two Brigades were airlifted with strategic airlift assets directly into the main international airport in Garville and subsequently moved to their respective Area of Responsibility (AoR) by road and helicopter. Heavy equipment was shipped through the Port of Eastland and moved overland by contractors under tight security. The 7CF force comprised two infantry brigade groups, each with three mechanized infantry battalions with attached armoured cavalry, artillery, engineer, medical, military police and logistics units. At force level, they maintained a Force Commanders Reserve (FCR), Special Operations Task Group (SOTG), Aviation Brigade (including transport and attack assets) and UAV assets. In addition, 7CF contributing nations maintained their own national support cells, including intelligence assets close to 7CF HQ in Garville.

The 7CF deployment caught many in Garland unawares, and most armed groups adopted a 'wait and see' attitude. Only in the north and west of the country was there any real push-back. This push-back came from Anti-Western Fighters (AWF) in the north, and from IK in the west, and manifested in anti-7CF/western slogans painted on walls and on social media, in some local protests, and in some low capability threshold attacks including isolated small armed fire at patrols, and one attempted Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attack, but did not result in any 7CF casualties.

c. **Threat Assessment.**

For a detailed threat assessment see Annex A.

d. **Mission Uniformed Component.** UNMMIG will initially comprise up to 8,000 military personnel, including 150 military observers and 120 staff officers. UNMMIG would commence its deployment by 01 May 18, reach initial operating capability (IOC) not later than 15 Jun 18, and full operating capability not later than 15 Jul 18.

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e. **Relevant Stakeholders.**

1) **United Nations Police (UNPOL).** UNMMIG Police, consisting of 1,500 police personnel, including 1,200 Formed Police Units (FPU) personnel and 300 Individual Police Officers (IPO) and will support the national authorities in the restoration of basic security and law and order in Garville and progressively across the country; assist to protect civilians under threat of physical violence; provide security, in coordination with the members of the Garland Government, for key national stakeholders, including members of the Garland Government; and contribute to create a secure environment for the restoration and extension of State authority. Following initial stabilisation, UNMMIG Police will assist in the preparation and conduct of electoral security. They will also undertake capacity building support to the Garland security forces in order that the host agencies assume full security and law and order responsibilities.

2) **United Nations Country Team (UNCT).** UNCT carries out operational activities for development, recovery and transition. The UN Resident Coordinator (RC), who in Garland is also the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) leads the UNCT. All UNCT members have direct-line accountability to their own organizations, as well as collegial accountability to the RC and rest of the UNCT for producing results. There are several UN agencies operating in Garland, many of whom have been present in the country for a significant period. Most of the UN agencies are dual-mandated and carry out developmental and humanitarian assistance.

3) **The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).** The HCT is composed of humanitarian UN agencies and representatives of NGOs and donors present in Garland. Its objective is to ensure that the activities of humanitarian organizations are coordinated, and that humanitarian action in-country is provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, that it is timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery. The HC leads the HCT and while HCT members have direct-line accountability to their own organization, they have collegial accountability to the HC and rest of the HCT for producing results. The HC reports to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). He/she is part of the senior UN leadership team and ensures appropriate coordination with the UNCT and humanitarian community. FAO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and UNWOMEN have offices in Garville. In UNMMIG, the HC also serves as the DSRSG and RC ('triple hat') reporting to the SRSRSG and the Chair of the UN Development Group (UNDG) respectively for those functions.

4) **International and National Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs/ NNGOs).** There are more than 50 INGOs operational in Garland, many of whom, as with the UN, are dual-mandated (carrying out both development and humanitarian assistance). There are also national NGOs and, as with the INGOs, they have varying mandates, funding sources, areas of operation and operational modalities.

5. **Strategic Framework.**

a. **Mandate.** By unanimously adopting UNSCR 2399, the UNSC established the UNMMIG mandate to support political processes in that country and to carry out a number of security-related tasks. UNMMIG should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.

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b. **Mission End State.** A democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens and enable peacebuilding activities to continue. The end state for the United Nations peacekeeping presence in Garland will be achieved when the minimum conditions to avoid a relapse into conflict and render stability irreversible can be sustained without the presence of United Nations troops and police contingents.

c. **Mission Objectives.** The overall objective of the UN in Garland is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in Garland, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which IDPs and refugees can return home in safety and in dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk

d. **Mission Concept.** The Mission will seek to achieve its objective through an integrated combination of:

- 1) Protection of UN personnel and facilities
- 2) Protection of Civilians
- 3) Monitoring the Ceasefire and Disengagement
- 4) Dialogue and Engagement
- 5) Support to Humanitarians and Human Rights Assistance

6. **Planning Parameters.**

a. **Area of Operations.** The Theatre of Operations comprises the Area of Operations (AO) and the Area of Interest (AI). The AO is defined by the territorial boundaries of the Garland.

b. **Area of Interest.** The AI includes the territories of the Garland neighbouring countries.

c. **Assumptions**

1) The Government of Garland will provide necessary security at ports and create soft landing conditions for the UNMMIG throughout the HOTO with 7CF.

2) Garland's neighbours will respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

3) The International Community will continue its support and commitment to the achievement of the desired end-state — lasting peace and stability in Garland and the development of institutional reform.

4) Current Government will continue to work with UNMMIG towards the establishment of sustainable peace in Garland.

5) Armed groups will continue to hold sway in their respective areas of influence.

6) Sub-national conflicts environment will continue to deteriorate due to competition for resources, proliferation of small arms, and weak rule of law.

7) Civilians will continue to be targeted by armed actors using violence, human rights violations, displacements, and increased humanitarian needs.

8) IDPs will continue to seek protection in the POC sites.

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d. **Constraints and Restraints.**

- 1) UNMMIG Force capabilities will be expected to support the UN and national police efforts whenever requested to bring criminal and rogue elements in Garland under control.
- 2) UNMMIG Force must provide priority to the protection of civilians, when allocating resources. Also, in case of any eventuality, protection of POC sites and UN personnel will take priority.
- 3) No UNMMIG military operations will be allowed in any of the countries adjacent to Garland.
- 4) Operations will be conducted in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws and conventions.
- 5) UNMMIG will apply and adhere to the requirements of the United Nations Human Rights, Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

e. **Risks.**

- 1) The presence of armed groups in territory where state presence is weak will continue to pose the most dangerous and immediate threat to the stability of the country.
- 2) The Government fails to address the longstanding grievances of the population.
- 3) Ceasefire agreements do not hold by majority of armed groups
- 4) Security incidents within POC sites increase, seriously threatening the safety and security of IDPs and UN and associated staff working in these areas.
- 5) Possibility of health risks or any pandemics.

7. **Military Component's mission**

UNMMIG Force is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in Garland in accordance to UNSCR 2399, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Garland through national elections and the maintenance of ceasefire arrangements.

a. **Military End State.** The desired end-state for UNMMIG will be reached when we have completed the following:

- 1) Created a safe and secure environment in Garland — one conducive to a stable civil society which promotes the protection of human rights in the country.
- 2) Established the relationships necessary with all military factions to transition to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, and rebuild the security sector.
- 3) Supported the development of institutions and government structures representative of the population and its needs.
- 4) Monitored and supported the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and confidence building measures.

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b. **Military Objectives.** The UNMMIG Force's strategic objective will be to create, as quickly as possible, the conditions necessary for all our peacekeeping partners to conduct their tasks in a safe and secure environment. Force assets and efforts will be initially concentrated in the Eastern Sectors where armed elements, extremist activity, organized criminal groups and inter-ethnic issues will present the biggest challenge.

c. **Intent.** We will focus our efforts on creating safe and secure conditions throughout Garland. As a first priority in Garland, every possible effort must be made to bring the parties to the conflict under control. To ensure the effective security, stabilization and protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group, we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. Law and order issues will impact significantly on the process of establishing a safe environment for all. Limitations in the capability of the international police force in UNMMIG, dictate the need for us to coordinate closely with and vigorously support it in certain circumstances. Peaceful resolution of all military-related issues is our objective.

d. Humanitarian conditions in Garland, particularly for the displaced in the South East area of the country, are currently assessed as poor. Within capabilities and security operational demands, UNMMIG forces are to assist agencies dealing with those in dire need. Close coordination with those agencies will be essential to ensure military assets are used judiciously and as a last resort.

e. Law and order in Garland are directly linked to the issue of security. Close cooperation with UNMMIG and national police performing law-and-order tasks, will be essential, as will the need to conduct joint military/police operations.

f. Use of military force must be a last resort in all situations. Our objective remains to resolve all situations peacefully and in accordance with UNSCR 2399.

8. **Execution.**

a. **Statement of Force Requirements (SFR)** The list of capabilities given under OPCON to the Force Commander are listed in the SFR as portrayed in annex B.

b. **Task Organization of the Military Component.** The first UNMMIG Force deployment should mirror that of the 7CF, comprising of 2 sectors: Sector East and West, as marked in Annex C along with major operating bases. However, this is suggested deployment, subjected to review as per operational requirement. The FHQ should also define clear geographical boundaries and delineate limits between units and the Sectors. Reserve units might be employed as per the Force scheme of manoeuvre.

c. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** In order to implement the mandated tasks, UNMMIG Force primarily responsibility is to protect civilians and create safe conditions in Garland by establishing a robust and proactive presence across the country, in order to reduce the threat of Armed Groups and support the extension of the State Authority.

The Force will continue to provide a safe and secure environment for the population until national security forces can assume full responsibility. To achieve these goals, the Force will:

1) Support the Mission in the implementation of the Political Strategy that integrates military pressure, dialogue, reconciliation and negotiation efforts,

2) Be ready to use decentralized air assets in order to support all bases within 1 to 2 hours by air assets.

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3) Provide effective Intelligence and information gathering in close coordination with other mission components and the analysis mechanism should be maintained at the Mission and Force levels to gain early warning.

d. **Phases.** UNMMIG military operations will be broken down into the following phases:

- 1) Phase I – Deployment
- 2) Phase II – Establish secure environment
- 3) Phase III – Consolidation - Support political processes in Garland, maintain secure environment, protect civilians from physical violence and support other mission-mandated tasks.
- 4) Phase IV – Transition
- 5) Phase V – Withdrawal & Exit

Phase I – Deployment

Tasks

Deploy and establish essential liaison in Sector West and East.

Phase II – Establish secure environment

Tasks

Sector East (Main Effort)

- Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector.
- Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians.
- Monitor activities of armed groups.
- Monitor and report on an escalation of inter and intra ethnic issues in the sector.
- Assist UNMMIG civilian police with law-and-order issues.
- Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts.
- Encourage respect for Human Rights and rule of law throughout the sector.

Sector West

- Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector.
- Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians.
- Monitor activities of factional forces.
- Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts.
- Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities.
- Encourage respect for Human Rights and rule of law throughout the sector.

Force Reserve

- Be ready to reinforce Sectors on order.
- Establish liaison with the UN police and local police for crowd control tasks.

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Military Observers

- As directed by Sector Senior Military Observers, assigned United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) teams are to assist, as appropriate, in establishing continuous observation of key areas for potential clashes between the former/current warring factions, and a military presence throughout their sectors.

Phase III – Support political processes in Garland, maintain secure environment, protect civilians from physical violence and support other mission-mandated tasks

Tasks

All Elements

- Maintain appropriate presence and security operations with an emphasis on civilians and local population at risk.
- Be prepared to, when directed,
 - Support the DDR process.
 - Coordinate and support with other national and international efforts to support the rebuilding of Garland.
 - Provide a secure environment for the election process and provide protection in cooperation with national security forces to designated person or groups.
 - Support and advise the redeployment of the Garland security forces in conflict.

Phase IV – Transition

Tasks

Phased handover of security responsibilities to Government of Garland

Phase V – Withdrawal & Exit

Tasks

Final drawdown of troops and complete handover of responsibility to the Government of Garland.

e. **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Prevention, pre-emption and deterrence of, and reaction to, any hostile act must be in accordance with the UNMMIG ROE. All members of the UNMMIG force must be trained on the ROE. This is a key to the successful implementation of UNMMIG's mandate and is to be initiated at the earliest opportunity for units before rotation deployment.

10. **Logistics**

11. **Administrative Issues.**

12. **Command, Control and Coordination.**

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13. **Acknowledgement.** The Force Commander will acknowledge receipt of the CONOPS and the requirement to produce the Force OPORD, which is to be shared with DPO/OMA for approval.

Under-Secretary General
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations

Under-Secretary General
Department of Operational Support
United Nations

Military Adviser
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations

Annexes:

- A. Threat Assessment. (omitted)
- B. Statement of Force Requirements.
- C. Mission Map.

Distribution: As directed by the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Under-Secretary for Operational Support, United Nations.

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ANNEX B - STATEMENT OF FORCES REQUIREMENTS

Unit Type	Number of Units	Unit Size	Total Troops	Remarks
Force HQ	1	60	60	
Support HQ Coy	1	90	90	for FHQ and 2 Sector HQs
Sector HQ	2	30	60	staff
MILOBS			150	
Infantry Battalion	9	600	5,400	Includes 1 FC Reserve
Long Range Reconnaissance Coy	2	250	500	Per sector
Special Forces Company	1	150	150	
Engineer Company	2	200	400	Per sector
Aviation Unit	1	100	100	2 Recce and 6 Attack Helicopters
Medium utility helicopter units	2	130	260	12 medium-lift transport helicopters Per sector
Level 3 Hospital	1	90	90	
Level 2 Hospital	2	70	140	Per sector
Military Police Unit	1	120	120	
Signals Coy	1	125	125	Includes comms for FHQ and 2 Sector HQs
UAV Squadron	4	50	200	3 UAS each
Logistic Coy	1	150	150	

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**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS MULTI DIMENSIONAL MISSION IN GARLAND (UNMMIG)**

INTRODUCTION

1. This document, including all of its Annexes (A-D), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Mission in Garland (UNMMIG).
2. This document provides the authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, responsibilities and definitions of the ROE.
3. These ROE are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which designated United Nations' military personnel may use force during the UN peacekeeping operation, UNMMIG. They are founded on UN Security Council resolution 2399. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they provide the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission. The ROE allows for the use of the necessary degree of force to guarantee self-defence and define the circumstances under which the use of force by UNMMIG military personnel may be justified.
4. In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:
 - a. Authorised Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNMMIG: Annex A
 - b. ROE for UNMMIG – DEFINITIONS & AMPLIFICATIONS: Annex B
 - c. ROE for UNMMIG – DIRECTIONS & PROCEDURES: Annex C
 - d. ROE for UNMMIG – WEAPON STATES: Annex D
 - e. ROE for UNMMIG – SOLDIER'S CARD: Annex E

AUTHORITY

5. The power and authority of UNMMIG is derived from Security Council resolution 2399 and must be exercised in a manner consistent with the UNMMIG mandate as described in this resolution.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

6. The area of operations for the application of these ROE is defined by the territory of Garland. This includes the adjacent airspace and any designated air and sea corridors to be utilized by UNMMIG.

MISSION

7. The relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 2399 dated 1 December 2017 for UNMMIG are contained in Annex A - Authorised ROE for UNMMIG.

EXECUTION OF ROE

8. Principles.

a. General:

- (1) The conduct of peacekeeping operations is guided by the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of International Law.
- (2) All UNMMIG military personnel must operate within the framework of this document, which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out by relevant Security Council Resolutions.
- (3) UNMMIG ROE provides direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of force within the mission area. They define the degree and the manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that the application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE inform commanders of the constraints imposed and the degree of freedom they have in the course of carrying out their mission.
- (4) Throughout the conduct of peacekeeping operations, where force is to be used, all UNMMIG military personnel must comply with the international principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to minimise the potential for collateral damage.
- (5) Contingents are only to use weapons authorised by the United Nations in accordance with the respective Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
- (6) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not:
 - I. Describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures.
 - II. Address safety-related restrictions.

b. Self-Defence:

- (1) Nothing in these ROE negates a Commander's right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
- (2) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals, or individual units under attack, as well as other UN military personnel who are able to assist those individuals or individual units under attack, or which are in imminent danger of being attacked.

c. **Military Necessity:** The principle of military necessity authorises the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the mission. Military necessity does not authorise acts otherwise prohibited under international law.

d. **Alternatives to the Use of Force:** Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potential hostile incident by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from local authorities).

e. **Duty to Challenge and Warn:** Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter any person or group from displaying hostile intent or committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given at Annex C

f. **Duty to Observe Fire/Target Identification:** See Annex C, paragraphs 1 and 6.

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Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force:

- (1) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary and proportionate to achieve the objective. In some circumstances operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.
- (2) The use of force should be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of response may have to be higher in order to minimise the cost in terms of UN casualties and civilian casualties.
- (3) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force such as negotiation, psychological methods, and other non-lethal means, which may include the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.

g. **Avoidance of Collateral Damage:** When force is used, all necessary measures are to be taken to minimise collateral damage.

h. **Duty to Report:** Each confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties and/or damages or not. More details are included in Annex C.

i. **Use of Force beyond Self-Defence.**

- (1) The use of force beyond self-defence may be applied only where necessary to fulfil the UNMMIG mandate, in the particular circumstances listed below, consistent with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1544 of 22 July 2006 and subject to the conditions set out in these ROE:

- I. Protection of UN, and other key, installations, areas or goods;
- II. Ensure security and freedom of movement of UNMMIG personnel;
- III. Permit UNMMIG personnel to discharge their duties;
- IV. Protection of civilians

- (2) The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorization has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

9. **Applicability:** The ROE set out in this document apply to all armed military personnel assigned to UNMMIG as authorised by the Security Council.

10. **Responsibility of the Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders:**

- a. The implementation of the ROE is a command responsibility. The ROE are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all Subordinate Commanders.
- b. The Force Commander and his/her Subordinate Commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, recommend more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, for United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ) approval. The Force Commander will issue the ROE to all contingents as received from UNHQ. He/she will ensure that all military personnel understand and apply these ROE correctly. The Force Commander and/or the subordinate commanders may issue additional guidance on the ROE and may incorporate these ROE into appropriate orders or instructions. The subordinate commanders must inform the Force Commander of such instructions issued by them.
- c. All commanders must seek clarification if they consider the authorised ROE to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.

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- d. It is the responsibility of the contingent commanders to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To this end, the ROE must be translated in a clear and concise way into the language of each troop contributing country. To assist in this process, they must issue to each individual a ROE Aide-Memoir (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for each contingent.
 - e. Training in the application of ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions must be conducted on a regular basis and as a minimum once per month and whenever UNMMIG military personnel, including individual replacements or reinforcements as authorised by the Security Council, are deployed into the mission area.
 - f. The Force Commander shall issue a Detention and Disarmament directive setting out his guidelines and procedures for implementing the ROE, including:
 - (1) Grounds for apprehension/detention;
 - (2) Search procedure following apprehension;
 - (3) Detention procedure following apprehension
 - (4) Weapons confiscation and disarmament;
 - (5) Treatment of detainees
11. **ROE Contravention:** The following procedures apply in dealing with a UN ROE contravention:
- a. Any ROE contravention must be reported to UN HQ (DPO), through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.
 - b. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed where the consequences are likely to affect them.
 - c. Remedial measures, including training, must be taken to avoid reoccurrence.
 - d. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. Any alleged contravention of the ROE must be investigated in accordance with the UNMMIG Standard Operating Procedures and the United Nations Directives for Disciplinary Matters involving Military members of National Contingents. The findings will be forwarded to United Nations Headquarters, which will provide relevant evidence and findings to the troop contributing country for follow-up and disciplinary action. The troop-contributing country may also undertake its own investigation.
12. **Security Classification:** The ROE should be classified as **UN RESTRICTED**.
13. **ROE Changes:** These ROE can only be amended or changed with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
14. **Revocation:** N/A

Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations

Annexes:

- A. *Authorised Rules of Engagement for UNMMIG*
- B. *ROE for UNMMIG – Definitions and Amplifications*
- C. *ROE for UNMMIG – Supporting Directives and Procedures*
- D. *UNMMIG Soldier's Card*

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ANNEX A

AUTHORISED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNMMIG

Security Council Resolution

1. The Security Council, by its Resolution 2399 (1 Dec 2017) decided to establish a United Nations Assistance Mission in Garland (UNMMIG) with effect from July 2017. The successful completion of the UNMMIG mission will result in Garland achieving peace and security.
2. The UN Security Council by its Resolution 2402 ratified the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for Garland to direct the operations of UNMMIG and coordinate all United Nations' activities in Garland.

UNMMIG Mandate

3. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2402 , the UNMMIG mandate consists of the following elements:

- ☐ To support, monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and confidence-building measures by the Government of Garland;
- ☐ To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;
- ☐ To support the implementation of the Agreement on the Peace and Reconciliation in Garland;
- ☐ To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;
- ☐ To support the government of Garland, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, developing and implementing programmes for Disarmament, Demobilization, & Reintegration (DDR) programme for all non-government forces; with particular attention to the special needs of civilians; and addressing the inclusion of non-Garland combatants.
- ☐ To provide security to the highest priority locations within capabilities and areas of deployment;

Protection of Civilians:

- ☐ To ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;
- ☐ To ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
- ☐ To support the efforts of the Garland Government to ensure the protection of civilians from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence;

Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

- ☐ To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- ☐ To monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Garland and to fight impunity, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including

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refugees, returning refugees and IDPs, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

Support for Security reform:

- ☐ To assist the Government of Garland in the monitoring and restructuring of the police force, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- ☐ To assist the Government of Garland in the formation of a new and restructured Garland military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

- ☐ To assist the Government of Garland in conjunction with other international partners, in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;
- ☐ To assist the Government of Garland in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to support the development of governmental institutions.

Authorization to use force

4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and in pursuance of its mandate the Security Council, UNMMIG may use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, to carry out the following tasks:

- Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;
- Contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
- Disarming the recalcitrant local armed groups in order to ensure their participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR) and the release of children associated with those armed groups;
- Disarming the armed groups in order to ensure their participation in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR) and the release of children associated with those armed groups;
- Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and their dependents, with particular attention to children, by monitoring the disarmament process and providing, as appropriate, security in some sensitive locations, as well as supporting reintegration efforts pursued by the Government of Garland in cooperation with the United Nations Country Team and bilateral and multilateral partners;
- Provide military training, including in the area of human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence, to various members and units of the security forces as part of international broader efforts to support the security sector reform;

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SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNMMIG

1. The following ROE have been authorised for use by UNMMIG Force:

Rule 1 — Use of Force

Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized:

- Rule 1.1 To defend oneself or other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent.
- Rule 1.2 To resist attempts to abduct or detain oneself or other UN personnel.
- Rule 1.3 To defend against a hostile act or hostile intent members of units of the local force.
- Rule 1.4 To resist attempts to abduct or detain members of units of the local force that one's unit has been assigned to assist or support.
- Rule 1.5 To defend individuals designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander against a hostile act or a hostile intent.
- Rule 1.6 To resist attempts to abduct or detain individuals designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander.
- Rule 1.7 To protect civilians, including humanitarian workers, under imminent threat of physical violence. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.8 To protect UN facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.
- Rule 1.9 To protect key facilities, installations, areas, equipment or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.
- Rule 1.10 Against any individual or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, in order to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.11 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or tends to limit the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers, in order to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.12 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of members of units of the Government of Garland that one's unit has been assigned to, in order to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.13 To prevent or put a stop to the commission of a particularly serious crime that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.
- Rule 1.14 To prevent or put a stop to acts of civil unrest. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.15 To prevent or suppress hostile activities or operations by illegal armed groups, including illegal foreign armed groups. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

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Rule 1.16 To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through roadblocks, checkpoints or cordons whose establishment has been authorized by the Force Commander if that forcible passage involves a grave threat to life or of seriously bodily injury.

Rule 1.17 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, is preventing or demonstrating an intent to prevent oneself or other members of one's unit from carrying out lawful orders issued by a superior commander, in order to ensure the ability of oneself or of other members of one's unit to carry out those orders.

Use of force, excluding deadly force:

Rule 1.18 To protect UN facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does NOT involve a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

Rule 1.19 To protect key facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does NOT involve a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

Rule 1.20 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, in order to ensure their freedom of movement.

Rule 1.21 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers, in order to ensure their freedom of movement.

Rule 1.22 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of members of units of the Garland Security Forces that one's unit has been assigned to assist or support, in order to ensure their freedom of movement.

Rule 1.23 To prevent or put a stop to the commission of a crime when providing assistance to the Garland Security Forces.

Rule 1.24 To disperse assemblies that are unlawful but not violent. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 1.25 To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through roadblocks, checkpoints or cordons whose establishment has been authorized by the Force Commander if that forcible passage does NOT involve a grave threat to life or of seriously bodily injury.

Rule 1.26 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, is preventing or demonstrating an intent to prevent oneself or other members of one's unit from carrying out lawful orders issued by a superior commander, in order to ensure the ability of oneself or of other members of one's unit to carry out those orders.

Rule 1.27 To prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities.

Rule 2 — Use of Weapon Systems

Rule No 2.1 Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons, ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament operation, is authorised.

Rule No 2.2 Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.

Rule No 2.3 Firing of weapons other than for organised training and as authorised in these ROE, is prohibited.

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- Rule No 2.4 Firing of warning shots is authorised.
- Rule No 2.5 Use of riot control equipment and agents is authorised.
- Rule No 2.6 Use of lasers for survey, range finding and targeting is authorised.
- Rule No 2.7 Use of explosives in order to destroy installations, facilities, equipment, supplies or workings is authorized, in the course of operations to prevent the provision of support to illegal armed groups.

Rule 3 — Authority to Carry Weapons

- Rule No 3.1 Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorised.
- Rule No 3.2 Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons such as machine guns, light mortars and handheld anti-tank weapons, is authorised.
- Rule No 3.3 Deployment and carriage of weapons on or in vehicles, aircraft and vessels, are authorised.

Rule 4 — Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm

- Rule No 4.1 If the use of force against a person or group is authorized by Rule 1, detention of that person or of members of that group is also authorized.
- Rule No 4.2 Searching of detained persons for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorised.
- Rule No 4.3 Disarming of armed individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorised.

Rule 5 — Duty to Hand-over Detained Persons to Appropriate Authorities

- Rule No 5.1 All detained persons are to be handed over to appropriate local authorities as soon as possible.

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ANNEX B

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNMMIG
DEFINITIONS AND AMPLIFICATIONS**

1. **Civil Unrest:** The commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence, which affect public peace and order.
2. **Collateral Damage:** Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorised target.
3. **Cordon:** A deployment of UNMMIG personnel around an object or location with the intent to isolate an area and restrict and/or control both access and exit.
4. **Detainee:** A detainee or detained person means any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction of an offence.
5. **Force:** The use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will. Such means are used by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of UNMMIG and generally imply the potential to use appropriate and authorised levels of violence.
 - a. **Armed Force:** The use of weapons, including firearms and bayonets. Note: Such weapons are generally designed to inflict deadly force but can also be used in a non-deadly manner.
 - b. **Deadly Force:** The level of force, which is intended, or is likely to cause, death regardless of whether death actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.
 - c. **Non-deadly Force:** The level of force, which is neither intended nor likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results.
 - d. **Minimum Force:** The minimum degree of authorised force, which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force is applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be deadly force if appropriate.
 - e. **Unarmed Force:** The use of physical force, short of the use of “armed force.”

NOTE: Riot control equipment and other “non-lethal weapons” may be used as a means of unarmed force as they are designed and intended to be used so as not to inflict deadly force.
6. **Hostile Act:** An action where the intent is to cause death, serious bodily harm or destruction of designated property.
7. **Hostile Intent:** The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action, which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorised. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:
 - a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
 - b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
 - c. Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Operations (AO).
8. **Loaded Weapon:** A weapon that has ammunition attached to it but none of the ammunition has been placed into the chamber.

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9. **Positive Identification:** Assured identification by a specific means. This can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.

10. **Proportionality:** The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter a hostile act or hostile intent, or to achieve an authorised objective.

11. **Reasonable Belief:** Reasonable belief is when the Commander, or individual, logically and sensibly concludes, based on the conditions and circumstances in which he or she finds him or herself that a hostile threat exists.

12. **Self-Defence:** Self-Defence is the use of such necessary and reasonable force, including deadly force, by an individual or unit in order to protect oneself, one's unit and all UN personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent.

13. **Pre-emptive Self-Defence:** Action taken to pre-empt an imminent hostile act, where there is clear indication that an attack is about to be made against oneself, one's unit and UN personnel.

14. **UN Personnel:** All members of UNMMIG (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), UN officials and experts on mission on official visits.

15. **Other International Personnel:** Personnel belonging to international agencies associated with UNMMIG in the fulfilment of its mandate, and other individuals or groups formally and specifically designated by the SRSG in consultation with UN HQ, including:

- a. Members of organisations operating with the authority of the UN Security Council (SC) or General Assembly (GA);
- b. Members of authorised charitable, humanitarian or monitoring organisations;
- c. Other individuals or groups specifically designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG); but excluding foreign nationals, such as businessmen and journalists.

16. **Warning Shots:** A warning shot is a signal demonstrating resolve, or a capability to convince persons to stop threatening actions, or as a warning and potential precursor to the actual use of deadly force. A warning shot is a shot fired at a safe point of aim with no intent to cause death, injury or severe damage.

AMPLIFICATIONS

17. **General Amplification to Rule No 1:** Rule No 1 generally allows the use of force up to and including deadly force in given circumstances. Any use of force must be graduated where possible and only the minimum force necessary to meet the threat must be used. This does not prevent the immediate use of deadly force if the threat to life is imminent and there is no alternative but to use deadly force immediately to remove that threat.

18. For the purposes of both Rule No 1.8, 1.9, 1.19 and Rule No 1.20, the following property has been designated by the SRSG and declared "designated property" by the Force Commander:

- a. UNMMIG aircraft and vessels, including any aircraft and vessels of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that are deployed to the UNMMIG AO for the purpose of assisting UNMMIG to fulfil the mandate (whether occupied or not);
- b. Occupied UNMMIG vehicles, premises and compounds (including police stations, courts, and other central and district administration buildings);
- c. Occupied vehicles, premises and compounds of organisations and agencies who are assisting UNMMIG in the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate, including United Nations specialised

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agencies, other international organisations, foreign government agencies and non-governmental organisations;

- d. Garland community power stations and water reticulation and purification plants (whether occupied or not);
- e. UNMMIG arming and refuelling points (whether occupied or not); and
- f. UNMMIG and civil communication facilities essential for UNMMIG command and control between battalions, units and higher headquarters (whether occupied or not).

19. Amplification to Rule No 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12: Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to restrict movement if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to prevent UNMMIG personnel from discharging their duty if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. This does not prevent you from using non-deadly force to resist the individual or groups attempt to prevent you from discharging your duties. If in so doing the response from that individual or group threatens yours or any other person's life, or is likely to cause serious injury, then deadly force may be used.

20. Amplification to Hostile Intent: Hostile intent will always be determined on a case-by-case basis and will be heavily dependent upon local conditions. Hostile intent can be demonstrated by:

- a. Persons that carry out armed attacks against UN personnel and other international personnel or against those falling under the protection of UNMMIG;
- b. Members of any military or paramilitary group or organisation carrying personal weapons or manning weapon systems, whether or not they are engaged in attacks against UN personnel, other international personnel and/or those falling under the protection of UNMMIG; Civilians that spontaneously take up arms against UN personnel, other international personnel or those falling under the protection of UNMMIG.

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ANNEX C

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNMMIG
SUPPORTING DIRECTIONS AND PROCEDURES**

GENERAL

1. **Identification:** Assured identification (positive identification) of hostile forces (groups and persons) prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited.
2. **Civil Action:** UNMMIG military personnel should avoid any action that would result in the disruption of legitimate civil activities in the mission area.
3. **Prohibitions:** The following prohibitions are to be observed, even when authorised ROE are being used:
 - a. Use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons is prohibited.
 - b. Use of weapons or methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
 - c. Use of weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.
 - d. Attacks on monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries, which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the UNMMIG shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes, which may expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property are strictly prohibited.
 - e. Use of methods of warfare to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking water installations and supplies.
 - f. Making installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
 - g. Engaging in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this paragraph above.
 - h. Engaging in punitive use of force and retaliation.
4. **Cordon Principles:** Cordons may only be conducted if the Force Commander judges that the situation warrants isolation of the area and that such action is consistent with the mandate of UNMMIG.

WARNING PROCEDURES

5. **General:** The use of armed force is normally a measure of last resort, in response to a hostile act or hostile intent. If a confrontation threatens the UNMMIG military personnel on the scene, the UN aim must be to dissuade the parties concerned from carrying on.

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6. **Graduation:** The following graduated procedures are to be observed:

- a. **Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration:** Every effort must be made to warn any potential or actual aggressor before UNMMIG military personnel respond with force. The aim is to stop hostile activity.
- b. **Unarmed Force:** If the preceding step is unsuccessful, where possible, minimum unarmed force may be employed. If riot control equipment or other non-lethal weapons are possessed by UNMMIG personnel trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring the threat to an end before having to resort to deadly force, then they may be used if authorised by the on-scene commander.
- c. **Charge Weapons:** An attempt should be made to make use of the visual and audible effect of charging weapons to convince any aggressor that failure to stop the aggressive activity may result in the use of deadly force.
- d. **Warning Shots:** If the threat continues, and subject to the orders of the commander on the scene, warning shots should be fired at a safe point of aim, to avoid causing personal injury or collateral damage.
- e. **Armed Force:** If all the preceding steps, including the use of unarmed force, are unsuccessful and there are no other choices available, the necessary armed force may be used. The decision to open fire will be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time. Before opening fire, a final warning is to be given as follows:
 - i. The warning may be given verbally (in English, in the local language, and/or visually by a sign or by illumination (e.g. hand-held red flares, searchlights, etc.).
 - ii. You are to challenge in English:
“UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I SHOOT.”
 - iii. This challenge will be repeated in French as follows:
“NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE.”
 - iv. The verbal or visual warning should be repeated as many (and at least three) times as necessary to ensure understanding or compliance.

FIRING PROCEDURES

7. **Opening Fire Without Warning:** The only circumstance, under which it is permitted to open fire without attempting to follow the warning sequence, would be if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that, even a moment's delay could lead to death of, or grievous injury to oneself, UN personnel and those who are under the protection of UNMMIG as specified in this ROE.
8. **Procedures During Firing:** The use of firearms must be controlled, and there should be no indiscriminate firing. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort. The following points must be kept in mind during fire:
 - a. Fire must be aimed.
 - b. Minimum rounds are to be fired to achieve the authorised objective.
 - c. All necessary precautions are to be taken to avoid collateral damage.
9. **Procedures After Firing:** After any weapon firing, the following actions are to be taken:

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- a. **Medical Assistance:** All injured persons should be given first aid as soon as possible, when such aid can be given without endangering lives.
 - b. **Recording:** Details of the incident are to be recorded, including:
 - i. Date, time and place of firing;
 - ii. Unit and personnel involved;
 - iii. The events leading up to firing;
 - iv. Why UNMMIG personnel opened fire;
 - v. Who or what was fired on;
 - vi. The weapons fired and the number of rounds discharged;
 - vii. The apparent results of the firing; and
 - viii. A diagram of the incident scene.
10. **Reporting:** Following an immediate report that firing has taken place, the above information and the current situation are to be reported through the UN chain of command, to the Force Commander and UN HQ (DPO), as rapidly as possible.

SEARCH AND APPREHENSION PROCEDURES

- 11. See the Force Commander's Detention and Disarmament Policy issued separately

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ANNEX D

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: AIDE-MEMOIRE (SOLDIER'S CARD)

GENERAL RULES FOR USE OF FORCE

1. The principles of minimum use of force and proportionality shall apply at all times and in all circumstances.
2. Wherever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort shall be made to control a situation through measures short of force, including personal contact and negotiation, visual signals, manoeuvres, charging of weapons and firing warning shots.
3. The use of force, including deadly force, shall only be resorted to if all other means to control the situation have failed or do not hold any promise of achieving the authorised objective.
4. Any force used must be limited in its intensity and duration to what is necessary to achieve the authorised objective and must be commensurate with the level of the threat. In some cases, operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.
5. Use force only when absolutely necessary to achieve your immediate aim, to protect yourself, your soldiers, UN or other designated personnel, installations, equipment and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
6. The decision to open fire shall be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time to obtain such an order. Before opening fire, give a final warning at least three times, either in French, which is the national and administrative language in the mission area, or in English:

“NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE”

“UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL FIRE”

You may open fire without warning only when an attack is so unexpected that a moment's delay could lead to death or grievous injury to yourself, to other members of the UNMMIG military component or to other persons who are under protection of UNMMIG military component as specified in these ROE.

1. Fire must be aimed and controlled. Automatic fire will be opened only as last resort. If possible, a single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of the body in order not to kill. Indiscriminate fire is not permitted. Fire for effect must not last longer than necessary to achieve the immediate aim.
2. Avoid or minimise collateral damage.
3. After fire has ceased, render medical assistance and record the details of the incident and report them as soon as possible through the chain of command, whether or not casualties have occurred.
4. When in doubt, always seek clarification from higher command.

You are allowed to use force, UP TO AND INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE:

1. To defend oneself, other UN personnel, individuals designated by the Head of Mission or other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent.
2. To resist attempts to abduct or detain oneself, other UN personnel, other international personnel or individuals designated by the Head of Mission;

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3. To protect installations, facilities, equipment, areas or goods designated by the Head of Mission against a hostile act or hostile intent;
4. To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance*;
5. To resist attempts by any person or group that limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers or individuals designated by the Head of Mission*;

**When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.*

You are allowed to use force, EXCLUDING DEADLY FORCE:

1. To prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities;
2. To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through a checkpoint** and to detain those who have forcibly effected passage through a checkpoint**.

***Whose establishment has been authorised by the Force Commander.*

3. Detained persons are to be handed over to appropriate local authorities as soon as possible.

Hostile Act: A hostile act is defined as an action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.

Hostile Intent: Hostile intent is defined as the threat of imminent use of force, demonstrated through an action, which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorised. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- The capability and preparedness of the threat;
- The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack;
- Historical precedent within the Mission's Area of Responsibility.

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UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL MISSION IN GARLAND
FORCE HEADQUARTERS



OPERATIONAL ORDER

UNMMIG Force Headquarters
Garville, Garland
Effective: 15 MAY 2018

Reference:

- A UNSCR 2399 dated 1 DEC 2017.
- B UNMMIG SRSG's Directive and Comprehensive Mission Strategy dated February 2018.
- C UNMMIG Mission Concept dated March 2018.
- D UNMMIG Mission-wide PoC strategy dated April 2018.
- E UNMMIG CONOPS dated April 2018.
- F UN Force HQ Handbook, Nov 2014

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: 8th Continent Eastern Time; UTC/GMT +6 hours.

Task Organization: at Annex A.

1. **SITUATION**

a. **Overall Security Situation** In mid-July 2017, the security situation in Garland began to deteriorate. This deterioration was exacerbated by the increased activity of the Eriyan National Liberation Front (ENLF) in the southeast of the country and the increase in extremist activity in the West, mainly close to the border with Westland. The civil war ongoing in Northland enhanced the tensions in Garland due to the influx of refugees from the North in northern provinces where threats to IDP camps already resulted in instability and episodes of violence.

Reports from the 7th Continent Force (7 CF) indicated that the humanitarian ceasefire in place between the Government of Garland and ENLF was not holding. This prompted regional and international concern that the Garland Armed Forces (GAF) would seek a definitive military solution to the issue. It is also worth noting that the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Garland and the Eriyan Independence Movement Fighters (EIMF), located further south in South Eri Province had still not been formalized. Furthermore, this patchwork of ceasefires without any overarching political settlement was judged to be a risk factor for the country's stability, for human rights, and for the protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas.

The main security-related incidents in the eastern part of Garland were related to harassment of populations within the IDP camps, restrictions of movement for the population and international forces,

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and low-intensity clashes and disputes between EIMF and ENLF over the control of border crossing points and natural resources, mainly mining sites.

In North West and West Provinces, the increased terrorist activity conducted by Imuna Kakuatan (IK) group increased instability in the area. The group has targeted security and military posts on both sides of the border with Westland. In addition, the possibility of IK links with Anti-Western Fighters (AWF) in the northern provinces further elevates the likelihood of attacks against the population. The renewed AWF extremist activity included anti-7CF/western slogans painted on walls and expressed on social media, some local protests, and low capability threshold attacks including isolated small arms fire at patrols, and one attempted Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attack, though without 7CF casualties.

Criminal activity also remains a source of instability around the country, with the presence of international criminal networks, mainly visible through Linohas activities in the northeast province and across the borders with Eastland.

Regional and international observers also noted with alarm bellicose statements from the Government of Eastland, which indicated that it would act to support its brethren in east and south-east Garland if the GAF was to re-engage in the conflict. These statements were followed by the Garland President threatening to invade Eastland.

The initial UN deployment to Garland noted that there was an increase in anti-UN sentiment over the course of its deployment. In both sectors, an anti-UN social media campaign manifested, particularly in Sector East, as armed groups in the area were concerned that the UN would threaten their control of border crossings. However, concerns were also raised by groups operating in Sector West, particularly along Garland's northern border over the potential impact of UNMMIG patrols. Ultimately, this situation culminated with information suggesting a credible threat of attack against UNMMIG patrols in both Sectors.

b. Opposing Armed Groups. Detailed threat profiles for relevant actors provide additional information about their background, interests and recent activities.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Mandate and Task of the Mission. By unanimously adopting UNSCR 2399, the UNSC established the UNMMIG mandate to support political processes in the country and to carry out a number of security-related tasks in support of the mandate. UNMMIG should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; assisting the reestablishment of State authority, rebuilding the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.

(2) UN Police. UNMMIG Police, consisting of 1,500 police personnel, including 1,200 Formed Police Units (FPU) personnel and 300 Individual Police Officers (IPO).

(3) INGOs/NGOs and UN Agencies. There are several UN agencies operating in Garland, many of whom have been present in the country for a significant period. Most of the UN agencies are dual-mandated and carry out development and humanitarian assistance. There are more than 50 INGOs and national NGOs operational in Garland and they have varying mandates, funding sources, areas of operation and operational modalities. The main concern is to facilitate a free and safe access of the humanitarian agencies to the population.

2. MISSION

The UNMMIG Force is to ensure Protection of Civilians (POC), facilitate the creation of a safe and secure environment for the immediate, full and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitor

the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements, support the stabilisation of Garland, and ensure safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets.

3. **EXECUTION**

a. **Intent:**

Focus efforts on creating safe and secure conditions throughout Garland, ensuring effective security, stabilization and protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group. As a priority in Garland, every possible effort must be made to bring the parties to the conflict under control and deterring or neutralizing any known threats against civilians before they emerge. Enhance coordination at sector and local level with HoO, UNPOL, Garland Security Forces (GSF) and Garland Armed Forces (GAF) all over the AoR. Protection of UN personnel and assets as well as humanitarian delivery is essential.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.**

(1) **Phase I: Deployment**

UNMMIG Force will deploy troops and rapidly start to conduct robust patrolling to ensure Freedom of Movement (FoM) with priority to the main areas in North Eri and the Western Provinces of Garland. Essential liaison should be established with UN, civilian and armed groups as soon as possible.

(2) **Phase II: Establish a Secure Environment**

UNMMIG troops should enhance presence throughout Force's AoR to deny armed elements freedom of action, dismantle any illegal check points, clear roads, and armed elements strongholds. BPT establish TOBs in vital areas to isolate armed groups from the IDPs/local population. Conduct clearing operations on the main supply routes in order to ensure security of UNMMIG logistic convoys. BPT shift effort anywhere else in the AoR and also support electoral process.

(3) **Phase III: Consolidation**

Establish new TOBs to ensure security of IDPs/local population. Continue robust patrolling and acquisition of peacekeeping-intelligence to maintain stabilization efforts. Support the extension of state authority around the country, monitor ceasefire implementation and improve FoM.

c. **Tasks to Subordinate Units.**

PHASE I - Deployment (1 May to 15 Jun 2018)

(1) **All subordinate units**

- (a) Deploy safely, providing proper force protection to UN troops, bases and assets. Conduct HOTO from 7CF troops.
- (b) Conduct robust patrolling. Maintain an aggressive posture against armed elements to prevent them from launching any attacks against UNMMIG troops/camps.
- (c) Ensure Freedom of Movement in the main supply routes.
- (d) Protect civilians, under threat of physical violence and the most vulnerable: IDPs, women, children and humanitarian.
- (e) Establish liaison with relevant stakeholders.

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- (f) Establish secure communication networks.
- (g) Enhance peacekeeping-intelligence gathering to support next phases.

PHASE II - Establish a Secure Environment (from 15 Jun 2018 until milestones are achieved)

(1) Sector West, Sector East

- (a) Protect civilians throughout AoR, with priority to those under threat of physical violence and the most vulnerable: IDPs, women, children and humanitarian agencies.
- (b) Strengthen security in and around UNMMIG bases.
- (c) Ensure UNMMIG FoM throughout the AoR.
- (d) Monitor humanitarian situation in the areas of deployment, facilitate FoM for humanitarian actors.
- (e) Ensure close coordination from sector to company level with other security partners (CLA, UNPOL, GAF, GSF), supporting GAF/GSF when required.
- (f) Deny armed elements freedom of action, dismantle any illegal check points, clear roads, and armed elements strongholds.
- (g) BPT establish TOBs in vital areas.
- (h) Isolate armed groups from the IDPs/local population through enhanced presence and constructive actions. Disarm all armed elements present in IDP/refugee camps.
- (i) Monitor herd flows and cattle markets during transhumance season.
- (j) Monitor mineral resources access and exploration by armed elements.
- (k) Monitor Human Rights violations. Implement strong and constant CRSV preventive measures in line with FC's directive.
- (l) Enhance peacekeeping-intelligence coordination, ensure information sharing and gather information based on the PIRs.

(2) FC Reserve

- (a) React quickly against an emerging threat or emergency across the country.
- (b) Priority deployment to hotspots in AoR by air and for a limited time frame.
- (c) BPT reinforce other sectors and units, participate in cordon and search operations, conduct extraction or rescue operations and arrest operations on designated targets.

PHASE III - Consolidation (on order)

(3) Sector West, Sector East, FC Reserve

- (a) Strengthen security in and around UNMMIG bases.
- (b) Ensure UNMMIG FoM throughout all AoR.
- (c) Establish new TOBs to ensure security of IDPs/local population.

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- (d) Continue robust patrolling and acquisition of peacekeeping-intelligence to maintain stability.
- (e) Support the extension of state authority around the country.
- (f) Monitor ceasefire implementation and improvement of FoM

Task to Enablers (All Phases)

(4) **Engineers Units**

- (a) Enhance and maintain mobility for operational units. Priority to main supply routes and routes that access PoC sites.
- (b) Be prepared to undertake any EOD task and tasks related to camp defense.
- (c) Any other task related to mandate implementation or FC's directives.

(5) **Aviation Units**

- (a) Carry out aerial reconnaissance and patrols with quick response over the entire country, to acquire information about threats.
- (b) Be able to deploy armed helicopters to support ground operations, providing aerial fire support as required.
- (c) Deploy a platoon size force with three days' sustenance in any part of country in less than four hours and to be able to reinforce it to a company size force in less than 24 hours.
- (d) Provide CASEVAC support according to CASEVAC policies in the entire country by day and night.
- (e) On order, conduct show of force missions over any given location.

d. **Military Observers.**

- (1) Military Observers deployed will maintain continuous liaison with local administration, community leaders, population, INGOs/NGOs and other UN agencies to gather and report information on armed groups activities in UNMMIG AoR.
- (2) Monitor and report to FHQ on Human Rights violations and on the situation in IDPs/camps.

4. **SERVICE SUPPORT**

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

By Order
UNMMIG Force Commander

Annex:

A Task Organization.


Annex A (TASK ORGANIZATION) To UNMMIG Operations Order

References: Garland Planning map, December 2017.


Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: 8th Continent Eastern Time; UTC/GMT +6 hours.

Task Organization

1. Force level



2. Sector level



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3. Description of Acquisition Assets

a. OPCON to FC

Acquisition Assets	Capabilities	UN Limitations	Remarks
3 x UAS Hermes	Max flying time 36 hours with a range of 600km. Service ceiling is 30,000 feet. Day and Night flight, and during adverse weather. Full ISR suite, including thermal imaging, and radar/ground target indication.	1 in the air, with 1 on notice to move, and one on maintenance at any time.	Sector must request support. Priority to Sector West.
3 x UAS Heron 1	Max flying time is 36 hours with a range of 600km. Service ceiling is 24,000 feet. Day and night flight and during adverse weather. Same capabilities as the Hermes but can also collect SPKI.	2 Herons can be in the air at any time, with one undergoing maintenance. The UN does not have a policy on SPKI and such acquisition is not permitted.	Sector must request support. Priority to Sector West. On call to Sector East.
1 x SOF Company	Capable of deploying 3 platoons that can operate section sized patrols more than 200 km from base in all terrain. SOF platoons are self-sustaining and can remain in the field for 10 days. Capabilities include Long Range Reconnaissance, Close Target Reconnaissance, Sniping, and Observation.	Caveat in place that SOF will not conduct patrols at strength of less than one section.	SOF often employed on FC tasks. Sector Commands must request support.
6 Heavy lift Heli assets (Mi-8)	Photo reconnaissance capability only	Only three airborne at any time.	One Mi8 OPCON to each Sector Comd.
IPKI Section	Satellite Imagery Interpretation	Interpreted Imagery arrives 3 days after initial request	
Gender Affairs Officer	Engagement with Sector Gender Focal points, and Engagement Platoons	Cell comprises of 3 officers	FHQ Staff
UN CIMIC Section	Engagement with Humanitarian Agencies, and NGOs	One section	FHQ Staff
Engagement and Outreach section	Engagement with local Key Leaders	One Section	FHQ Staff

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b. OPCON to Sector HQ

Acquisition Asset	Capabilities	UN Limitation	Remarks
3 x UAS Sparrow	30 km range. Ceiling altitude of 10,000 feet. Duration of flight 4 hours. Can fly by day and night. Difficult to fly in adverse weather conditions. Photo reconnaissance and Infrared capability.	2 operational while one is retained in reserve	OPCON to SHQ
IPKI Cell	Capable of interpreting UAS photos		
Long Range Reconnaissance Company	Equipped with 2 light armoured recce platoons, capable of deployments for up to 5 days, operating at distances of more than 200km from base. Each company is also equipped with a short range UAS (range 70 km, and max duration of flight at 6 hours, which is primarily used for Force Protection), and ground surveillance radar (again used primarily for FP).	Will not operate at under Platoon strength.	OPCON to SHQ.
Ground Holding Units	Each sector has four Battalions, each with three Mechanized Infantry Companies and one short range reconnaissance company with a range of 30-50 km forward of the FOB.	Nil	OPCON to SHQ
Gender Affairs Officer	Engagement with Battalion Gender Focal points, and Engagement Platoons	Cell comprises of 3 officers	SHQ Staff
UN CIMIC Section	Engagement with Humanitarian Agencies, and NGOs	One section	SHQ Staff
Engagement and Outreach section	Engagement with local Key Leaders	One Section	SHQ Staff